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ABSTRACT
Fixed Constitutional Meaning and Other
Implausible Originalisms
Frederick M. Gedicks
Department of Comparative Arts and Letters, BYU
Master of Arts
Public-meaning originalists contend that judges properly interpret the Constitution only
when they discover and apply its “original public meaning”—how the public understood the
Constitution at the time it was adopted. Public-meaning originalism is premised on the “fixation
thesis”—the meaning of any constitutional text is fixed when it is adopted. Concerns of the
present, therefore, cannot affect constitutional meaning. Public meaning originalists acknowledge
that the search for the fixed original meaning is not always successful, but it is always ontologically
“there” to be found, even if epistemologically we sometimes fail to find it.
The fixation thesis underwrites the powerful rhetoric of fidelity originalists deploy against
nonoriginalists. Originalists insist that judges who interpret the Constitution using nonoriginalist
approaches are “making up” constitutional meaning. But if original public meaning does not exist
in the past as a fact which present interpreters can objectively retrieve, public-meaning originalists
are equally guilty of “making it up.” The public-meaning enterprise thus rises or falls with its
ontological claim that original public meaning is a fact in the past which anyone from the present
can recover and apply without altering its objective character.
Most public-meaning originalists have ignored the philosophical hermeneutic thesis that
any investigation of the past is also shaped by the perspective of the interpreter in the present; the
meaning of any text is mutually constituted by past and present. In this view, meaning does not
exist in the past as a fact, but is created by the very interpretive effort to find it.
Only two public-meaning originalists have defended the fixation thesis against this
critique. Keith Whittington rejected it outright in his early work, while Lawrence Solum recently
argued its compatibility with fixation. Both arguments fail. “Fixed constitutional meaning” and
the other purported objectivities in which public-meaning originalists wrap their theory are no less
touched by interpretive subjectivity than the theories new originalists attack. Like all human
inquiries into proper action in particular situations, constitutional interpretation is necessarily
affected by particularities of the judge, the issue before her, and their relation to constitutional
history and contemporary constitutional imperatives. None of this is subject to adjudication by a
priori rule or objective method, as public-meaning originalists imagine.
No one is “faithfully” interpreting the Constitution in the way public-meaning originalists
imagine. Everyone is doing the same interpretive thing, trying to connect the exigencies of the
present with a document more than two centuries in force. The fixation thesis is false.
Keywords: Aristotle, constitutional interpretation, fixation thesis, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Martin
Heidegger, hermeneutics, new originalism, ontology of meaning, originalism, public meaning
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INTRODUCTION: MAKING IT UP
Originalists contend that judges properly interpret the Constitution only when they discover
and apply its original meaning. 1 Originalists initially looked for this meaning in the intentions of
the framers, 2 but later abandoned intent for “original public meaning”—how the general public
understood the Constitution at the time it was adopted. 3 This “public-meaning” or “new”
originalism is now the most widely held originalist theory of constitutional interpretation, 4 so
dominant that even nonoriginalists are pulled in its direction. 5 We are all new originalists now.
A crucial premise of public-meaning originalism is the transparently named “fixation
thesis,” which provides that the meaning of any constitutional text is fixed when it is drafted and

E.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 5-6 (1990); RANDY E.
BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY 5 (2004) [hereinafter BARNETT, THE
LOST CONSTITUTION]; KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL
INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 35 (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION]; Lawrence B. Solum,
Semantic Originalism 173 (Illinois Pub. L. & Legal Theory Res. Papers Series, Working Paper No. 07-24, 2008)
[hereinafter Solum, Semantic Originalism], available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1120244.
1

E.g., Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 17, 22 (1972); Richard
S. Kay, Adherence to Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW.
U.L. REV. 226 (1988); Edwin Meese III, Speech to the American Bar Association (July 9, 1985), available at
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/08/23/07-09-1985.pdf.
2

E.g., BARNETT, THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 5; ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 17
(1997); WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 35; Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists,
45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999) [hereinafter Barnett, Originalism for Nonoriginalists]; John O. McGinnis & Michael B.
Rappaport, Originalism Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction,
103 NW. U.L. REV. 751, 756, 762 (2009). See also District of Colum. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576-619 (2008) (5-4
dec.) (majority opinion by Scalia, J.) (exhaustively documenting the “normal and ordinary” meaning of the text of the
2nd Amendment when adopted in 1791 and applied to the states by the 14th Amendment in 1868).
Although initially a framers-understanding originalist, see supra note 2 and accompanying text, Judge Bork
later converted to public-meaning originalism, see BORK, supra note 1, at 144.
3

McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 3, at 761; Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 1, 4; Keith E. Whittington,
Originalism: A Critical Introduction, 82 FORD. L. REV. 375, 380 (2013) [hereinafter Whittington, Critical
Introduction]. See also William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015) (arguing that
some versions of originalism satisfy a Hartian rule of recognition as positive law of the United States).
4

5
E.g., The Nomination of Elena Kagan to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Hearing
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 111th Cong. 62 (2010) (statement of Kagan) (“Sometimes
[the framers] laid down very specific rules. Sometimes they laid down broad principles. Either way, we apply what
they tried to do. In that way, we are all originalists.”).

1

ratified. 6 According to the fixation thesis, the original public meaning of the Constitution cannot
change. It follows that the present and its concerns cannot affect constitutional meaning. Publicmeaning originalists see this as a feature, not a bug: constitutions are put into writing precisely to
constrain government and its agents; 7 written constitutions accomplish this by “locking-in” or
“fixing” invariable rules of law to bind the government. 8 Judges do not make the meaning of a
written constitution, they discover it. 9 All originalists accept the fixation thesis, 10 which Justice
Scalia called the “great divide” between originalism and other interpretive theories. 11
Public-meaning originalists acknowledge that epistemic obstacles sometimes prevent
discovery of original meaning. 12 Nevertheless, none of them questions the existence of original
public meaning, regardless of its epistemological recoverability. For public-meaning originalists,
“What is the original public meaning of the Constitution?” is an empirical question whose answer
Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis: The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1, 1 (2015) [hereinafter Solum, The Fixation Thesis].
6

7

BARNETTE, THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 103.

BARNETT, THE LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 105 (If a constitution is “reduced to writing and executed,
where it speaks it establishes or ‘locks in’ a rule of law from that moment forward.”); SCALIA, supra note 3, at 40
(“One would suppose that the rule that a text does not change would apply a fortiori to a constitution. [I]ts whole
purpose is to prevent change, to embed certain rights in such a manner that future generations cannot readily take them
away.”); WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 54, 56 (“[O]nly a fixed text can provide judicial instruction
and therefore be judicially enforceable against legislative encroachment . . . . The constitutional constraint on the
people’s agents can emerge from the text as intended . . . only if the text has the fixed meaning it is uniquely capable
of carrying.”).
8

9

E.g., WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 5-11 passim.

10
SCALIA, supra note 3, at 6; Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66
(2011) [hereinafter Barnett, Interpretation & Construction]; see Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 6, at 4, 30;
Whittington, Critical Introduction, supra note 4, at 378.
11

SCALIA, supra note 3, at 38.

E.g., SCALIA, supra note 3, at 40; Barnett, Gravitational Force, supra note 12, at 416; Michael Ramsey, Frederick
Mark Gedicks: Lawrence Solum and the Thesis of Immaculate Recovery, THE ORIGINALIST BLOG (Oct. 31, 2017),
http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2017/10/frederick-mark-gedicks-lawrence-solum-and-thethesis-of-immaculate-recoverymichael-ramsey.html; Solum, Fixation Thesis, supra note 6, at 12; Whittington,
Critical Introduction, supra note 4, at 403.
12

2

is an objective fact in the world. 13 Public-meaning originalism, therefore, rests on an ontological
assumption, that meaning exists in the past as a fact. Ontology is the study of being or existence,
of everything that “is.” 14 The fixation thesis presupposes that original public meaning “is” in the
past in some way that leaves it unaffected by contemporary efforts to recover and apply it. In this
view, the original public meaning of the Constitution is always “there” to be found, 15 even if we
sometimes fail to find it and, indeed, even if we fail to look for it at all.
The fixation thesis underwrites the powerful rhetoric of fidelity that public-meaning
originalists deploy against nonoriginalists. Public-meaning originalists insist that only when
judges apply the original public meaning of the Constitution do they uphold its commitments to
popular sovereignty, limited government, and rule-of-law. 16 Judges who decide on some other
(nonoriginalist) basis are simply “making up” constitutional meanings to suit their preferences. 17
Of course, if constitutional meaning does not exist in the past as a fact which can be objectively
retrieved, then public-meaning originalists are “making it up,” too. The public-meaning enterprise

Lawrence B. Solum, A Reader’s Guide to Semantic Originalism and a Reply to Professor Griffin, 41 (Illinois Pub.
L. Res. Papers Series, Working Paper No. 08-12, 2008) [hereinafter Solum, Reader’s Guide],
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1130665.
13

ANTHONY KENNY, A NEW HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 160 (2010); e.g., Aristotle, Metaphysics (W.D. Ross
trans.), in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 779 vi.1 1026a15-16 & -30-33 (Richard McKeon ed. 1941) [hereinafter
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE] (“[T]he first science deals with . . . being qua being—both what it is and the attributes which
belong to it qua being.”). All citations to Aristotle are to the page number in WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra, followed
by the Roman numeral of the book, the Arabic number of the chapter, and, if applicable, the Bekker line number(s).
14

Cf. Barnett, Gravitational Force, supra note 12, at 416 (“[W]hen conflicting interpretive claims arise about meaning,
there is (á la Gertrude Stein) a there there to potentially to resolve the conflict.”). Stein actually suggested there isn’t
a “there” there. See GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 298 (1937) (referring to Oakland, California).

15

BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, 103-04, 107; WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 56;
Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 1, at 4.
16

17
See, e.g., Justice Clarence Thomas, “How to Read the Constitution,” Manhattan Institute Wriston Lecture (Oct. 16,
2008) (“[T]here are really only two ways to interpret the Constitution—try to discern as best we can what the framers
intended or make it up.”), excerpt reprinted in “Commentary,” WALL ST. J., Oct. 20, 2008, at A19. See also Baude,
supra note 4, at 2351 (“Originalists rely on an intuition that the original meaning of a document is its real meaning
and that anything else is making it up.”).

3

rises or falls with its claim that public meaning is a fact objectively resting in the past, which
anyone from the present may recover and apply without altering its objective factual character.
Unless this claim is true, public-meaning originalism hardly differs from other approaches to
constitutional interpretation. 18
With so much riding on the fixation thesis, it is surprising that most public-meaning
originalists merely assume the ontology that underwrites it. They largely ignore the philosophical
hermeneutic thesis that “original” textual meaning is shaped by the demands of the interpreter in
the present, and not solely those of the text in the past; the meaning of any text, in other words, is
constituted by past and present. 19 Textual meaning does not lie around the past like a rock, waiting
for someone to pick it up and carry it back to the present. Rather, it is precisely the interpretive
effort in the present to articulate the meaning of a text from the past which creates textual meaning.
To paraphrase Faulkner, the past is never just the past, but always also the present. 20
Two prominent public-meaning originalists have defended the fixation thesis and its
ontological claim against this hermeneutic critique. Professor Whittington rejected it outright in
his early work, 21 while Professor Solum recently argued its compatibility with fixation. 22 Both
For a discussion of these other approaches, see PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1982).
18

19
See generally, HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Joel Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall rev. trans.
2nd rev. ed. 2013) (1960) [hereinafter GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD].

Cf. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN act ii, sc. 3, at 92 (1951) (“The past is never dead. It’s not even
past.”). Or, to paraphrase Stein correctly, see supra note 15, there is no “there” there, until we look for it.
20

WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 74-76, 92-94, 102-08.
Keith Whittington is the William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Politics at Princeton University. His early
work provided much of the theoretical foundation for public-meaning originalism. See WHITTINGTON,
INTERPRETATION, supra note 1; KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND
CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTRUCTION].
21

Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism, Hermeneutics, and the Fixation Thesis [hereinafter Solum, Hermeneutics and the
Fixation Thesis], in THE NATURE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION: WHAT JURISTS CAN LEARN ABOUT LEGAL
INTERPRETATION FROM LINGUISTICS AND PHILOSOPHY 130 (Brian G. Slocum ed. 2017) [hereinafter LEGAL
INTERPRETATION].
22

4

misunderstand the hermeneutic argument, though this, too, has gone largely unremarked in the
critical originalist literature. 23
Public-meaning originalism rests on the twin assumptions that original public meaning is
a fact existing in the past unaffected by our present knowledge of it, and that proper method can,
in principle, recover and apply this meaning in the present without altering its objective factual
character. I will argue that this account of constitutional interpretation contradicts the account of
textual understanding offered by philosophical hermeneutics, and is additionally ontologically
implausible. The original public meaning of the Constitution is an effect of both past and present:
the tradition of prior understandings through which constitutional meaning is handed down to us,
and the concerns which trigger the interpretive search for its current meaning.
I develop and defend this thesis in four parts. Part I provides a detailed examination of the
fixation thesis and the ontological assumptions on which it rests. Part II discusses the hermeneutic
challenge to fixation by Martin Heidegger’s argument that human understanding is structured by
one’s prior relations with other persons and things in the world, 24 and Hans-Georg Gadamer’s
adaptation of this ontology to textual interpretation. 25 Part III considers the specific arguments of
Lawrence Solum is Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center. Solum’s
many working papers and published articles have illuminated the philosophical foundation of public-meaning
originalism, particularly in philosophy of language. E.g., Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 1.
23
The only direct ontological criticism of public-meaning originalism is an incisive book chapter by Professor Mootz,
the leading legal academic on philosophical hermeneutics and law. Francis J. Mootz III, Getting over the Originalist
Fixation, in LEGAL INTERPRETATION, supra note 22, at 156 [hereinafter Mootz, Originalist Fixation] (criticizing
Solum, Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 22). See also Francis J. Mootz, The Ontological Basis of
Legal Hermeneutics: A Proposed Model of Inquiry Based on the Work of Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur, 68 B.U.
L. REV. 523 ((1988). A few scholars have noted the ontological assumptions of public-meaning originalism without
exploring them in depth. E.g., Rik Peters, Constitutional Interpretation: A View from a Distance, 50 HISTORY AND
THEORY 117 (2011).

MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans. 1962) [hereinafter HEIDEGGER,
BEING & TIME].
24

GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19; HANS-GEORG GADAMER, REASON IN THE AGE OF SCIENCE (Frederick
G. Lawrence trans. 1981) [hereinafter GADAMER, AGE OF SCIENCE]; HANS-GEORG GADAMER, PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS (David E. Linge ed. & trans. 1976) [hereinafter GADAMER, HERMENEUTICS].
25

5

Professors Whittington and Solum, showing that they misunderstand Gadamer’s arguments about
interpretive horizons and application of interpretive meaning. Part IV criticizes examples that
Whittington and Solum deploy against hermeneutic ontology; it also analyzes a classic American
film, It’s a Wonderful Life, 26 and a canonical Supreme Court decision, Brown v. Board of
Education, 27 to illustrate the improbability of the fixation thesis, and the more intuitive account of
textual understanding offered by philosophical hermeneutics. I conclude with some observations
about the claims of new originalists to exclusive interpretive fidelity.
I. FIXED CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING
The fixation thesis provides that two sets of facts fix the meaning of any constitutional
provision when adopted: facts about the semantics of the text, and facts about the context
surrounding the text’s adoption. 28
A. Semantics
The Constitution is written in clauses, which constitute the basic unit of analysis for publicmeaning originalists. 29 Each word in a constitutional clause possesses an ordinary linguistic
meaning established by conventional patterns of usage existing at the time the clause was
adopted. 30 Rules of syntax and grammar in force at adoption, as evidenced by contemporaneous
usage in newspapers, magazines, pamphlets, dictionaries, and legal and other public documents,

It’s a Wonderful Life (RKO Liberty 1946). Part IV-D is drawn from Frederick Mark Gedicks, It’s a Wonderful
Originalism! Lawrence Solum and the Thesis of Immaculate Recovery, 31 DPCE ONLINE 653 (Oct. 2017).
26

27

347 U.S. 483 (1954).

28

E.g., Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 6, at 28.

29

Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 1, at 50-51.

30

Id. at 60.

6

dictate how these words fit together as a predication or statement. 31 Ordinary meaning, syntax, and
grammar in use at the time of adoption together constitute and fix the original semantic meaning
of a clause—that is, the meaning a literate person of the time would have understood solely from
the words of the clause.
Public-meaning originalists maintain that once fixed in a written constitutional clause,
semantic meaning exists in the past as a fact. This entails two claims. First, that semantic meaning
is objective; it exists apart from and unaffected by whatever particular individuals might think
about it. As Professor Barnett declares, “the English language contains words with generally
accepted meanings that are ascertainable independent of any of our subjective opinions about their
meaning.” 32 References to the “factual” and “objective” character of original public meaning
abound in the public-meaning literature. 33
Second, the factual existence of original public meaning entails the claim that the semantic
meaning of the Constitution is objectively ascertainable. References to the “objective” or “factual”
character of original public meaning imply a world whose contents are verifiable regardless of
who undertakes the verification. 34 If the original public meaning of the Constitution is an objective
31

See BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 93; Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 1, at 51.

32

BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 105.

E.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 3, at 17 (“We look for a sort of objectified intent—the intent that a
reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”); Barnett,
Gravitational Force, supra note 12, at 415 (“New Originalism . . . seeks to establish an empirical fact about the
objective meaning of the text at a particular point in time.”); Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 6, at 28:

33

The public meaning of the text that was proposed in 1787 was necessarily determined in large part by the
conventional semantic meanings of the words and phrases that make up the text and the regularities of usage
that are sometimes summarized as rules of grammar and syntax. Conventional semantic meanings and syntax
are determined by linguistic facts—that is, by regularities in usage.
34

See NICOLA ABBAGNANO, DIZIONARIO DI FILOSOFIA 379 (2nd ed. 1971) (author’s translation):
[A “fact” is] an objective possibility of verification . . . , in the sense that anyone can verify it oneself given
the same conditions. “It is a fact that x” means that x can be verified or ascertained by anyone in possession
of the appropriate means, or can be consistently described or predicted.

7

fact, it follows that everyone who undertakes the methodologically proper search for this meaning
will find the same thing, regardless of personal identity, commitments, or situation. 35 As Professor
Solum has declared, “bare semantic content is recognized or discovered rather than created . . . .”36
In principle, a conscientious interpreter is able to articulate the original semantic meaning of a
constitutional clause without altering its objective factual character. 37
Professors Barnette and Solum have used the Domestic Violence Clause to illustrate the
role semantics plays in fixing meaning. 38 This clause provides, “The United States . . . shall protect
each of [the states] on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot
be convened) against domestic violence.” 39 Today “domestic violence” means physical or sexual
abuse by one family member of another, with “domestic” pointing towards the home where family
life is conventionally centered. When the Domestic Violence Clause was adopted along with the
rest of the Constitution in the late 1780s, however, this usage was unknown—indeed, many actions
now considered abusive were then numbered among the prerogatives of male heads of household.
The fixation thesis holds that the meaning of “domestic violence” was fixed in 1788 when
the Domestic Violence Clause was adopted along with the rest of the Constitution. Thus, the clause

For summaries of the complex philosophical issues surrounding “objectivity” and “fact,” see ABBAGNANO, supra, at
379-81; Kevin Mulligan & Correia Fabrice, Facts, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Edward N.
Zalta ed. Winter 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/facts/.
See WHITTINGTON, CONSTRUCTION, supra note 21, at 7 (“Ideally interpreters set aside their own interests in the case
at hand in order to pursue an objectively demonstrable, correct outcome.”).

35

36

Solum, Reader’s Guide, supra note 13, at 3.

See, e.g., BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 105; SCALIA, supra note 3, at 140; WHTTTINGTON,
INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 39, 52-53; Barnett, Gravitational Force, supra note 12, at 415.
37

38

E.g., Barnette, Gravitational Force, supra note 12, at 416; Solum, Fixation Thesis, supra note 6, at 16-17.

39

U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 4 (1788).

8

cannot include contemporary understandings of “domestic violence” like physical or sexual abuse
of children or spouse. Subsequent changes in usage—“linguistic drift”—cannot change the
original semantic meaning of “domestic violence” courts apply to contemporary disputes, because
that meaning was fixed upon the clause’s adoption. 40
B. Context
Original semantic meaning is rarely sufficient to resolve constitutional cases and
controversies. Public-meaning originalists acknowledge the necessity of supplementing the bare
semantics of the text with context—additional relevant information which specifies and stabilizes
semantic meaning. 41 Just as the original semantic meaning of the Constitution is time-bound, so is
the context surrounding semantic meaning, consisting of those circumstances known or available
to the public at the time the Constitution was adopted. 42 This “publicly available context” consists
of textual context and historical context.
1. Textual Context
Sentences are rarely uttered in isolation. Where a sentence appears in the larger
conversation or document of which it is a part influences its meaning. 43 The same is true of
constitutional clauses. Where a clause appears in the Constitution—for example, which clauses

40

Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 6, at 17.

See WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 35, 60; Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 1, at 59.
See also SCALIA, supra note 3, at 37 (“In textual interpretation, context is everything . . . .”); Solum, The Fixation
Thesis, supra note 6, at 28 (“Additional [interpretive] work is done by . . . facts about the context of constitutional
communication . . . .”).
41

42

Solum, The Fixation Thesis, supra note 6, at 28.

43

E.g., BARNETT, LOST CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 105.

9

surround it, how a clause is grammatically marked off from others, the section and article in which
a clause is placed—affects its meaning. 44
Again, the Domestic Violence Clause is illustrative. It forms part of a longer sentence
containing several clauses:
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against
domestic Violence. 45
Preceded immediately by the Invasion Clause, which obligates the United States to repel any
forceful occupation of a state originating outside its borders, the Domestic Violence Clause seems
to take up the analogous problem of violent rebellions against a state government occurring within
its borders. The Domestic Violence Clause obligates the federal government to put down these
internal revolts on state request, just as the Invasion Clause obligates federal defense against
attacks originating outside a state’s borders. The Invasion and Domestic Violence Clauses form
part of Article IV, which generally clarifies rights and obligations among the states, their respective
citizens, and the federal government as constituent parts of the newly formed Union, 46 including
when the newly formed federal government may or must deploy its military resources to assist a
state. Finally, the Constitution elsewhere expressly authorizes Congress to maintain a standing

44
See WHITTINGTON, CONSTRUCTION, supra note 21, at 6 (referring to originalist interpretation from “the four corners
of the [constitutional] document”); Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 3, at 54 (“Context” includes “the whole
text of the Constitution . . . .”). See also SCALIA, supra note 1, at 17 (Public-meaning originalists look for “the intent
that a reasonable person would gather from the text of the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.”).
45

U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 4 (1788).

See id., § 1 (providing that public acts and records in one state shall be recognized in the others, and vesting in
Congress power to specify required proof and collateral effects); id., § 2, cl.1 (declaring privileges and immunities of
citizenship to citizens traveling through or residing in states other than the one where they live); id., § 2, cl.2 (providing
obligation of extradition of escaped criminals); id., § 2, cl.3 (denying states power to free slaves fleeing from other
states, and providing obligation of return); id., § 3 (providing for congressional admittance of new states, but protecting
territorial integrity and existing extra-territorial claims of states in existence at ratification).
46
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army and to federalize state militias, 47 and expressly names the President “commander-in-chief”
of these forces. 48
The textual context of the Domestic Clause confirms that “domestic violence” means
violent rebellions originating within a state against its legitimate authority.
2. Historical Context.
Public-meaning originalists claim that semantic meaning is a fact existing at a particular
time, in a particular place, for particular reasons. Each clause of the Constitution was likewise
adopted at a particular time and place for particular political imperatives and social considerations.
New originalism relies on historical sources to retrieve the historical context surrounding adoption
of the Constitution and its amendments, “to elucidate the understanding of the terms involved and
to indicate the principles that were supposed to be embodied in them.” 49 For example, the
Constitution was adopted after the widely recognized failure of the Articles of Confederation,
notably the impotence of Congress in the face of state intransigence and protectionism which
prevented formation of a true economic union of the states. The Articles existed only because of
the Revolution, which itself was driven by the many colonial grievances against the British
Parliament and monarchy, some of which were set forth in the Declaration of Independence. These
particular problems generated particular constitutional provisions, such as the Commerce Clause,
which foreclosed state tariffs and other acts of state economic protectionism by removing the
power to regulate interstate commerce from the states and vesting it in Congress.

47

U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cls.12-16 (1788).

48

Id., art. II, § 2, cl.1.

49

WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 35.
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Once more, the Domestic Violence Clause illustrates how historical context contributes to
constitutional meaning. When the U.S. was governed by the Articles (1781-88), the states were
bedeviled by internal rebellions, euphemistically called “the people out of doors.” 50 These ranged
from organized attacks on state governments such as Shays Rebellion, to loosely organized mobs
of local citizens. At the Philadelphia Convention, Federalists insisted that the newly conceived
federal government be vested with sufficient military power and constitutional authority to
extinguish these rebellions and mob actions. 51
A public-meaning originalist would conclude that the historical context surrounding
adoption of the Domestic Violence Clause stabilizes and specifies its semantic meaning, excluding
the possibility that the clause refers to child and spousal abuse in favor of the understanding that
it imposes upon the federal government the obligation to deploy its military forces to put down,
upon state request, rebellions originating within a state. 52
*

*

*

Public-meaning originalists claim that the meaning of any constitutional clause is fixed
when the clause is adopted. The components of fixation are the semantic meaning of the clause, as
specified by its textual and historical contexts. This fixed original meaning exists in the past as an
objective fact. In principle, those who follow proper public-meaning methodology can recover this
meaning without altering its objective, factual character.

GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 319-28 (1998) [hereinafter WOOD,
AMERICAN REPUBLIC].
50

51

GORDON WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC: 1789-1815, at 111 (2009).

52

U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 4 (1788).
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II. ONTOLOGICAL CHALLENGES
New originalism depends on the ontological claim that the original public meaning of the
Constitution is a fact always “there” in the past to be found, regardless of whether or how we look
for it. Gadamer challenged this claim in Truth and Method, easily the most consequential work on
hermeneutics in the 20th century, 53 as even some new originalists acknowledge. 54 Drawing on
Heidegger’s ontology in Being and Time, 55 Gadamer provides an extended argument against the
possibility of methodologically “objective” interpretation in the “human sciences”—that is, in
historical, legal, literary, theological, and similar “humanistic” texts.56 Gadamer argues instead
that textual meaning is mutually constituted by past and present, 57 directly contradicting the
fixation thesis. If textual meaning is composed of influences and elements of the present as well

See, e.g., JEAN GRONDIN, INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 2 (1994) [hereinafter GRONDIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS]; JOEL WEINSHEIMER, GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS: A READING OF TRUTH AND
METHOD ix (1985).
Important criticisms of Truth and Method in English include Emilio Betti, Hermeneutics as the General
Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften (1962) [hereinafter Betti, Hermeneutics], in JOSEPH BLEICHER,
CONTEMPORARY HERMENEUTICS: HERMENEUTICS AS METHOD, PHILOSOPHY, AND CRITIQUE 51, 58, 73 (1980), and
E.D. HIRSCH, VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION app. II at 245-64 (1967). Betti, Hermeneutics, supra, draws its principal
themes from EMILIO BETTI, TEORIA GENERALE DELLA INTERPRETAZIONE (2nd ed. 1992) (2 vols.) (1955) [hereinafter
BETTI, TEORIA GENERALE].
53

See, e.g., Solum, Hermeneutics and Fixation Thesis, supra note 22, at 145 (calling Truth and Method a “powerful
and influential theory of hermeneutics”).
54

55
See GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 255-64 (discussing HEIDEGGER, BEING & TIME, supra note
24).

“Human sciences” is a common translation of the German Geisteswissenschaften, whose sense is somewhat broader
than the English “humanities,” including as well law and most of what are now known as the “social sciences.” See,
e.g., RICHARD E. PALMER, HERMENEUTICS: INTERPRETATION THEORY IN SCHLEIERMACHER, DILTHEY, HEIDEGGER,
AND GADAMER 98 (1969). The term literally translates as “sciences of the spirit,” which refers to those areas of study
in which humans interpret other humans and their work rather than natural objects or phenomena. See generally
“Geist,” “Gieisteswissenschaften” & “Wissenschaft,” in THE OXFORD-DUDEN GERMAN DICTIONARY 319, 811 (W.
Scholze-Stubenrecht & J.B. Sykes eds. 1994) [hereinafter OXFORD GERMAN DICTIONARY].
56

57
See, e.g., GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 301 (Understanding a work from the past “will always
involve more than merely historically reconstructing the past ‘world’ to which the work belongs. Our understanding
will always retain the consciousness that we too belong to that world, and correlatively, that the work too belongs to
our world.”).
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as the past, as Gadamer contends, it follows that the meaning of a “traditionary” text from the past
does not exist unless and until someone in the present interprets it and thereby contributes the
necessary present component of meaning.
Unlike public-meaning originalism, the hermeneutics of Heidegger and Gadamer does not
propose an interpretive method. Methods are epistemologically oriented; they provide
justifications for knowledge claims. 58 Truth and Method describes how understanding happens,
not how we justify it as knowledge. 59 Its claim that understanding is constituted by the present as
well as the past directly challenges the ontology assumed by the fixation thesis, which
conceptualizes constitutional meaning as an objective fact existing in the past independently of
present influences and considerations.
A. The Circularity of Human Understanding
Writing a generation before Gadamer, Heidegger decisively rejected the conceptual
separation of the human subject from its object of knowledge, 60 which underwrites so much of
Western thought. 61 In this conventional view, each of us is “inside” ourselves in our subjective
minds, while “outside” is the objectively real world. This separation creates an epistemological
gap; a centuries-old preoccupation is transcending this gap, how to build an epistemological bridge
from the merely subjective in-here to the objectively real out-there.

See KENNEY, supra note 14, at 624 (describing how scientific method confirms theories); e.g., GADAMER,
HERMENEUTICS, supra note 25 at 199 (Neo-Kantian method “assumed without question that what can be known is
really grasped by the sciences alone, and that the objectification of experience by science completely fulfills the
meaning of knowledge.”).
58

59

GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at xxxiii.

60

HEIDEGGER, BEING & TIME, supra note 24, at 128, 131.

See ROBERT SOLOMON, CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY SINCE 1750: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SELF 153-67 passim
(1988); e.g., RENÉ DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 63-70 (Donald A.
Cress trans. 3rd ed. 1993) (1637/1641).
61

14

Heidegger described the problem of subject/object separation with the metaphor of a box
in which subjective consciousness is imprisoned from the objective world outside. If
“[t]ranscendence . . . is taken to be the relationship that somehow or other maintains a passageway
between the interior and exterior of the box by leaping over or pressing through the wall of the
box,” then “the problem arises of how to explain the possibility of such a passage.” 62 Most
philosophers, he suggests, pursue a solution in some epistemology like causation, psychology, or
physiology. 63
Heidegger himself denied the separation of subject and object, thereby eliminating the
epistemological gap between them. He posited instead that human beings have a necessarily prior
involvement with every person and thing they seek to understand. 64 We are not independently
existing subjects who breach the “box” of consciousness to reach the equally independent world
outside; we are rather always, at every moment, already in the world alongside other persons and
things:
When [human being] directs itself towards something and grasps it, it does not somehow
first get out of an inner sphere in which it has been proximally encapsulated, but its primary
kind of Being is such that it is always “outside” alongside entities which it encounters and
which belong to a world already discovered. 65

MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LOGIC 160-61 (Michael Heim trans. 1984)
[hereinafter HEIDEGGER, METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS].
62

63

Id. at 161.

See WILLIAM RICHARDSON, HEIDEGGER: THROUGH PHENOMENOLOGY TO THOUGHT 85 (3rd ed. 1974); SOLOMON,
supra note 61, at 162.
64

HEIDEGGER, BEING & TIME, supra note 24, at 88-89.
Heidegger abandoned the term “human being” for the German Dasein, in order to avoid the philosophical
and cultural freight attached to the former. See infra note 67. I’ve retained “human being” for accessibility.
65
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Human “being,” in this view, is not bare self-existence—“I think, therefore I am” 66—but a “beingthere,” 67 a “being-in-the-world.” 68 Having this kind of being, Professor Leiter explains, “we exist
practically absorbed in a world ‘already constituted,’ constituted precisely by the practical
involvements we have with the things and people in it.” 69 The “there” of Heideggarian being,
therefore, is less a location than an attitude, an openness towards the possibilities of existence
afforded by the situations in which one finds herself. 70
Heidegger’s conception of human being generates special meanings for “understanding”
and “interpretation.” “Understanding” is one’s projection of oneself into the possibilities of
existence available to her in the particularities of her situation. To understand something is to
realize it as a possible way to exist. 71 Understanding thus entails self-development; one’s being is
also a becoming. 72 Rather than discovery of objective meaning, “interpretation” is development of
the understanding of one’s possibilities. To “interpret” something is to bring “explicitly into sight”
its possibilities for one’s existence. 73

66

DESCARTES, supra note 61, at 19.

HEIDEGGER, BEING & TIME, supra note 24, at 153-57 (emphasis added).
“Being-there” is the customary English translation of Dasein, a German noun upon whose verb form
Heidegger plays for a fresh conception of the freighted term “human being.” See “dasein,” in OXFORD GERMAN
DICTIONARY, supra note 56, at 191 (intransitive verb meaning “to be”).
67

68

HEIDEGGER, BEING & TIME, supra note 24, at 80, 107, 141 (emphasis added).

69

Brian Leiter, Heidegger and the Theory of Adjudication, 106 Yale L.J. 253, 271 (1996).

70

See THOMAS SHEEHAN, MAKING SENSE OF HEIDEGGER: A PARADIGM SHIFT 95 (2015).

71

HEIDEGGER, BEING & TIME, supra note 24, at 184.

72

Id. at 188.

Id. at 189. For a succinct discussion of understanding and interpretation in Being and Time, see Leiter, supra note
69, at 271-76.

73
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Human being-in-the-world precludes understanding and interpretation from yielding
objective knowledge of the world. We cannot grasp the meaning and significance of things in the
world independently of who we are and what we preliminarily know about them, 74 because we
are, at every moment, already living in the world alongside them, bound up with them in preexisting relationships. 75 Heidegger calls these preexisting relations the “fore” structure of
understanding, 76 whose various components unavoidably shape our understanding of other people
and things in the world. 77
Nevertheless, the fore-structure does not permit us to make of the world anything we wish.
While my presuppositions of meaning shape my understanding of the world, the “facticity” of the
world, to use another of Heidegger’s specialized terms, also shapes that understanding. 78 The
“brute facts” of one’s situation open some possibilities of existence and close off others. 79 All of
us are thrown into situations in the world with possibilities and limitations. The possibilities we
choose define who we are, but who we are influences the possibilities we choose. One’s choices
among possibilities give her life meaning, but this meaning determines the possibilities she finds
HEIDEGGER, BEING & TIME, supra note 24, at 191-92. See also id. at 190-91 (“[W]hen something within-the-world
is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of
the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation” of the thing.).
74

75
Id. at 191-92 (“An interpretation is never a presuppositionless apprehending of something presented to us. If . . .
one likes to appeal to what ‘stands there,’ then one finds that what ‘stands there’ in the first instance is nothing other
than the obvious undiscussed assumption of the person who does the interpreting.”).
76

Id. at 192.

77

Id. at 191.

78
Id. at 82 (“The concept of ‘facticity’ implies that an entity ‘within-the-world’ has Being-in-the-world in such a way
that it can understand itself as bound up in its ‘destiny’ with the being of those entities which it encounters within its
own world.”).

Heidegger uses “factical” to distinguish “factual”: we cannot become anything we wish, although precisely how our
possibilities and limitations interact with our choices is never fixed in advance as “factual” might imply See David
Couzens Hoy, Heidegger and the Hermeneutic Turn, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO HEIDEGGER 170, 179-80
(Charles Guignon ed. 1993) [hereinafter CAMBRIDGE HEIDEGGER].
79
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attractive. For Heidegger, understanding and interpretation are necessarily circular: understanding
is always self-understanding, interpretation always self-interpretation.
Heidegger’s claim is not that individual subjectivity distorts the true appearance of objects
independently existing in the world. 80 Rather, he claims that subjects and objects have no existence
outside of their relationships with each other. It’s not that there is no objectivity in the world (or
subjectivity, for that matter), it’s rather that there are no pure subjects or pure objects. What we
call “subjectivity” and “objectivity” are combined in every person and thing in the world. 81
B. The Circularity of Textual Understanding
1. The Problem of the Circle
Gadamer adapted Heidegger’s ontology to textual interpretation in Truth and Method.82
His point of departure is the problem of the “hermeneutic circle,” which acquired particular
salience with the Reformation’s emphasis on sola scriptura. 83 If Christians were to read and
understand the Bible themselves, without the constraints of hierarchy and tradition, they would
need interpretive guides that nevertheless would not supplant the direct sense of the text; the
hermeneutic circle was one of them. 84 The reformers held that the meaning of any particular
biblical text is constituted by its place in the history of salvation recounted in the Christian Bible.
But the meaning of the Bible is itself constituted by each biblical text—the aphorisms, miracles,

80

See GRONDIN, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 53, at 95.

Cf. HEIDEGGER, BEING & TIME, supra note 24, at 125 (criticizing the Cartesian subject as existing “in such a way
that it needs no other entity in order to be”). See also Harrison Hall, Intentionality and World: Division I of Being and
Time, in CAMBRIDGE HEIDEGGER supra note 79, at 122, 135 (observing that for Heidegger human being is inseparable
from the being of the world).
81

82

GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 278-317.

83

See id. at 181-83.

84

See GADAMER, AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 25, at 95.
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parables, poems, and stories contributing to the whole of salvation history. 85 In short, the meaning
of the whole of the Bible is constituted by its individual parts, but the meaning of each such part
is constituted by its place in the whole of the Bible.
This circular structure of understanding represents a problem for the human sciences: How
can there be reliable interpretive knowledge? The meaning of a text depends on its place within a
larger tradition, but the meaning of this tradition depends on the meaning of the texts which
compose it, including the text whose meaning is at issue. This leaves no firm epistemological
foundation on which to ground correct textual understanding. As Charles Taylor described the
problem:
What we are trying to establish is a certain reading of a text or expression, and what we
appeal to as our grounds for this reading can only be other readings. We are trying to
establish a reading for the whole text, and for this we appeal to readings of its partial
expressions; and yet because we are dealing with meaning, with making sense, where
expressions only make sense or not in relation to others, the readings of partial expressions
depend on those of others, and ultimately of the whole. 86
The hermeneutic circle was a source of 19th-century anxiety about the influence of
subjectivity in the human sciences. The Romantics believed the texts of the human sciences were
repositories of knowledge, but that subjective attributes of the interpreter too easily contaminated
that knowledge. 87 They addressed this problem by imitating the natural and physical sciences,
developing methodologies for the human sciences which, like the scientific method, sought to
minimize or eliminate the subjective influence of the interpreter. 88 The Romantic approach was to
HANS W. FREI, THE ECLIPSE OF BIBLICAL NARRATIVE: A STUDY IN EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURY
HERMENEUTICS 172-83 (1974).
85

86

Charles Taylor, Interpretation and the Sciences of Man, 25 REV. METAPHYSICS 3, 6 (1971).

See BLEICHER, supra note 53, at 102-03 (“The situatedness of the interpreter has proved an embarrassment to those
theorists who so persistently strove towards approximating the ideal of objectivity, as they saw it realized in natural
science.”).

87

See BLEICHER, supra note 53, at 108-09; DONATELLA DI CESARE, GADAMER: A PHILOSOPHICAL PORTRAIT 90 (Niall
Keane trans. 2013).
88
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abandon one’s subjectivity in the author’s, so as to understand the meaning of the text even better
than the author did. 89
But scientific method is not so easily transferred to the human sciences. “Objectivity”
means something more in physics or geology than in literature or law, even after Kuhn. 90 Whatever
the being of a rock might be, we can be sure it is not human being. By contrast, the human sciences
entail precisely humanity’s investigation of human existence, of humanity itself. 91 Humans
interpret the meaning of texts authored by other humans; these texts are encased in traditions which
influence, and are influenced by, how human interpreters understand these very texts.
Suppose I’m a philosopher set to review a book about Plato. A review setting out only my
own thoughts about Plato, without considering the book’s approach and its place in the tradition
of classical Greek philosophy, would not be a review of the book. At the same time, it would be
absurd to write the review as if I had no personal views about Plato and no knowledge of the
Platonic tradition. Nor can I neutralize how the tradition has informed my view of Plato, or how
my own views might have reciprocally influenced the tradition. It is impossible for me to approach
the book from “intellectual nowhere,” without any preconceptions whatever. 92

89

See BLEICHER, supra note 53, at 15; DI CESARE, supra note 88, at 71-72.

90

THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962).

91

See supra note 56.

This hypothetical is drawn from DI CESARE, supra note 88, at 88, and Jean Grondin, Gadamer’s Basic
Understanding of Understanding [hereinafter Grondin, Gadamer’s Understanding], in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION
TO GADAMER 36, 40 (Robert J. Dostal ed. 2002) [hereinafter CAMBRIDGE GADAMER]. See also GADAMER, TRUTH &
METHOD, supra note 19, at xxix (speculating about the effect of European history on the history of “North American
Eskimo tribes” notwithstanding their development wholly independently of Europeans):
92

In fifty or a hundred years, anyone who reads the history of these tribes as it is written today will not only
find it outdated (for in the meantime he will know more or interpret the sources more correctly); he will also
be able to see that in the 1960s [when Truth and Method was published] people read the sources differently
because they were moved by different questions, prejudices, and interests.
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The problem of the hermeneutic circle is this: Every text is encased in a tradition which
preconditions how readers understand both the text and themselves, at the same time that readers
themselves contribute to this same tradition by interpreting the texts which form it, including the
text they’re interpreting. It seems, therefore, that textual interpretation cannot yield knowledge.
2. The Promise of the Circle
Just as Heidegger argued that the forestructure of understanding conditions how we interact
with the world, so Gadamer maintains that comparable preconceptions about a text—he calls them
“prejudices,” in the sense of prejudgment—shape how we understand it:
A person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting. He projects a meaning for
the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text. Again, the initial
meaning emerges only because he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard
to a certain meaning.” 93
We cannot free ourselves from traditions and the textual preconceptions they engender, to see
these independently of our interpretations of them or their influence on us. Instead, we are always
within traditions, which shape how we understand ourselves as well as the texts we interpret. 94
Gadamer dealt with this circularity by embracing it. The circle is not a “problem” for
textual understanding, but the condition of its possibility. 95 Since interpretive neutrality is
impossible, our preconceptions of a text’s meaning are the only basis on which we can initially
understand anything about it. The key is that we not be unknowingly trapped within them: one

93

Id. at 279.

94

Id. at 294.

95

Hoy, Heidegger, supra note 79, at 185. See also HEIDEGGER, BEING & TIME, supra note 24, at 195:
If the basic conditions which make interpretation possible are to be fulfilled, this must rather be done by not
failing to recognize beforehand the essential conditions under which it can be performed. What is decisive is
not to get out of the circle, but to come into it in the right way.
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who pretends to interpretive neutrality has disregarded her preconceptions, leaving her unable to
imagine other possibilities. 96
Gadamer illustrates how our preconceptions enable us to access the past with the concept
of the classical. “Classical” here refers not to antiquity, but more generically to the height of
achievement, an exemplar of the perfect. 97 This sense of “classical” depends on both past and
present; one cannot describe a past summit of literature or art as “classic” without the sense of a
present in relative decline. The classical requires both an exemplary past and a present which no
longer measures up; it is “preservation amid the ruins of time.” 98 When we encounter a “classic”—
say, a Shakespearean play—we are predisposed to regard it as exceptional, and simultaneously to
regard contemporary works in the genre as diminished by comparison. Our understanding of a
classical work, therefore, “will always involve more than merely historically reconstructing the
past ‘world’ to which the work belongs.” 99 There is always the sense that the world of the work
and the world which calls it “classic” are connected, that “we too belong to that world, and
correlatively that the work too belongs to our world.” 100
The idea of the classical illustrates how the circular structure of understanding constitutes
meaning from both past and present. Our current prejudices are our only means of connecting with
the classical past, as a height of achievement which necessarily includes a perception of current

GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 369 (“A person who does not admit that he is dominated by
prejudices will fail to see what manifests itself by their light.”). See also GADAMER, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 25,
at 27 (Consciousness of the effect of history “seeks to be aware of its prejudgments and to control its own
preunderstanding; and thus it does away with . . . naïve objectivism . . . .”).
96

97

GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 297, 299.

98

Id. at 301.

99

Id.

100

Id.
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decline. To understand the past, therefore, is to participate in an “event of tradition, a process of
transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated.” 101
The hermeneutic circle captures the dialogical relation of the tradition from the past with
the interpreter in the present. “Understanding” means to grasp the content expressed by the text,
from the standpoint of one’s own place in the present. 102 Unlike the Romantics, who sought
identity with the author, hermeneutics recognizes the temporal distance between author and
interpreter, between the familiarity of the tradition and the strangeness of the temporally distant
text.103 The “real meaning of a text” is determined by both the original situation of the author and
her audience and the present situation of the interpreter. 104
3. Textual Interpretive Knowledge
Nineteenth-century historicists sought to escape the hermeneutic circle methodologically,
by figuratively walling themselves off from the effects of history on them and their
interpretations. 105 Gadamer calls this naïve: method enables historicists to imagine they are
engaged in the objective excavation of facts, while the history they write is actually historically
conditioned. 106 Public-meaning originalism resembles nothing so much as 19th-century
historicism. 107

101

Id. at 302.

102

Id. at 306.

Id. See also GADAMER, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 25, at 23-24 (“[T]he reading and writing of what is written is
so distanced and detached from its author . . . that the grasping of the meaning of the text takes on something of the
character of an independent productive act.”).
103

104

GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 307.

105

Id. at 293, 304.

106

GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 310.

107

Mootz, Originalist Fixation, supra note 23, at 159.
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For example, consider whether Brown v. Board of Education is consistent with the original
meaning of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. 108 Brown famously held that racial
segregation in public education violated this clause, but did not address its original meaning. 109
The conventional view is that the 14th Amendment was not generally understood to require racially
integrated public schools at the time it was adopted. 110 The historicist would rely on some
epistemological method (like public-meaning originalism) to provide an answer free of her own
preferences, thoughts, and desires.
More than half a century after it was handed down, Brown has been canonized as
constitutional scripture; any constitutional scholar who attacks the legitimacy of Brown’s
desegregation holding risks academic oblivion. No one can escape the effect of this canonization
on their understanding of the decision. Even so committed a public-meaning originalist as Judge
Bork strayed to defend Brown. 111 The salient question is not whether Bork’s argument is correct,
but why he felt compelled to make it? Bork himself answers the question: no self-respecting law
professor can do other than defend the result in Brown, whatever the cost to originalist theory. 112
108

347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Amendment provides in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1 (1868) (emphasis added). The italicized language constitutes the Equal Protection
Clause.
109

347 U.S. at 492 (“[W]e cannot turn back the clock to 1868 when the [14th] Amendment was adopted.”).

110
See, e.g., Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1955). See also infra Part IV-E.

Compare BORK, supra note 1, at 75 (“[N]o one [in 1868] imagined the equal protection clause might affect school
segregation.”) with id. at 81-82 (The framers of the 14th Amendment misunderstood that racial segregation is
inconsistent with the principle of equality constitutionalized by the Equal Protection Clause.).

111

Id. at 77 (The “end of state-mandated segregation was the greatest moral triumph constitutional law had ever
produced,” the “high ground of constitutional theory” whose defense became a scholarly imperative.).
112
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As Gadamer generalizes the point, “Understanding is, essentially, a historically effected event.
[W]e are always already affected by history.” 113
Consciousness of the effects of history is consciousness that the interpreter exists in an
historical situation: she is standing within the situation, not in some space outside it. 114 As a publicmeaning originalist, Judge Bork could not have objectively, independently, dispassionately
analyzed whether Brown is consistent with the original public meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause, nor could he have objectively, independently, dispassionately analyzed whether Brown
does or should have the moral authority it has, because he was always already entangled in the
realities that no academic of any reputation can undermine Brown, and that public-meaning
originalism is not a viable interpretive theory in the current academic environment if it cannot
account for Brown.
History works its effects on us whether we realize it or not—and we generally don’t,
without conscious effort. Our historical situation constitutes a horizon beyond which we cannot
see, 115 unless we place ourselves in the situation of another whose meaning has challenged us and
caused us to question and suspend our prejudices. 116 Gadamer describes this as being “pulled up
short” by the text:
How do we discover that there is a difference between our own customary usage
and that of the text? [G]enerally we do so in the experience of being pulled up short by the
text. Either it does not yield any meaning at all or its meaning is not compatible with what
we had expected. 117
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GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 310, 311.
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Id. at 301.
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Id.
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Id. at 302.

Id. at 280. See also id. at 375 (“W]e have experiences when we are shocked by things that do not accord with our
expectations . . . . A question presses itself on us; we can no longer avoid it and persist in our accustomed opinion.”);
GADAMER, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 25, at 92 (“[W]e are guided by preconceptions and anticipations in our talking
117
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One who is challenged in this way becomes conscious of the preconceptions which had
unconsciously determined her understanding, problematizing them and causing her to suspend
their validity. This enables “the text, as another’s meaning,” to “be isolated and valued on its own”
rather than appropriated to support one’s preconceptions. 118 And this, in turn, opens up interpretive
possibilities that were previously closed to the interpreter by her fore-conceptions. 119
Understanding is the fusion of two “horizons,” that of the text and that of ourselves. 120 We
fuse horizons by posing the alterity of the text from the past against our own present expectations
of its meaning: “Every encounter with tradition that takes place within historical consciousness
involves the experience of a tension between the text and the present.” 121 The interpreter
imaginatively projects herself into the past of the text.122 “It is always part of understanding that
the view that has to be understood must assert itself against the power of those tendencies of
meaning that dominate the interpreter.” 123 This does not mean objectifying the other horizon, as
if one were an uninvolved Cartesian subject observing it from the outside; we are not horizonal
tourists who visit the text like a theme park before returning to the safety of home. This would put

in such a way that these continually remain hidden[;] it takes a disruption in oneself of the intended meaning of what
one is saying to become conscious of these prejudices as such.”).
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Id. at 316-17.
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Id. at 522-23.
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nothing of the interpreter at risk; 124 it forecloses that the text “can be a claim on us.” 125 Nor is this
fusion the interpreter’s Romantic loss of herself in the horizon of the past, which is another selfdeception. 126 It is precisely oneself whom one must project into the past horizon; only then can the
interpreter place in question her expectations of meaning. 127 It is because the text “makes a claim
on us” that we are spurred to understand it. 128 With the interpreter’s own preconceptions and
prejudices at risk within the horizon of the text, she is in a position to consider, in Gadamer’s
words, if what the text is saying to us “could be right.” 129
*

*

*

The hermeneutic circle was a “vicious” circle for the Romantics, who sought to found
interpretation in the human sciences on something resembling the methods of natural and physical
science. To them the circle was epistemological quicksand that could never support reliable
knowledge. Heidegger argued that, quicksand or not, the circle was unavoidable as a matter of
ontology. The question is not how to avoid the circle, but how to deal with it.
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Id. at 314.
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Id. at 303 (emphasis added).
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Id. at 316, 458.
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Id. at 281:
[W]e cannot stick blindly to our own fore-meaning about the thing if we want to understand the meaning of
another[;] we remain open to the meaning of the other person or text. But this openness always includes our
situating the other meaning in relation to the whole of our meanings or ourselves in relation to it.
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Id. at 522-23.

Id. at 303. See also id.at 458 (“[T]he other world we encounter is not only foreign but is also related to us. It has
not only its own truth in itself but also its own truth for us.”); id. at 504 (“Understanding . . . does not consist in a
technical virtuosity of ‘understanding’ everything written. Rather, it is a genuine experience . . . , an encounter with
something that asserts itself as truth.”).
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Gadamer applied Heidegger’s ontological circle to textual interpretation. Since there is no
“god’s-eye view” of the world from which we can see it “as it really is,” 130 our foreconceptions,
generated by our necessarily prior relationship to the texts we interpret, are where understanding
must start. But this does not end in an interpretive solipsism that makes of a text whatever we wish;
text and tradition also make their claims. Understanding is the fusion of these two horizons,
interpreter and text, present and past. The hermeneutic circle is not a vicious obstacle to
understanding, but its very condition.
III. FIXATION EPISTEMOLOGY AND HERMENEUTIC ONTOLOGY
The fixation thesis holds that the meaning of a traditionary text like the Constitution is
fixed by the semantic meaning of its words and clauses, and the context that existed when they
were adopted as the Constitution. For public-meaning originalism, the factual existence of this
fixed original meaning is assumed, leaving the focus on the epistemological problem: which
method most reliably uncovers the semantic meaning and relevant contexts which fix
constitutional meaning in the past?
Philosophical hermeneutics provides an answer to the ontological question that publicmeaning originalists only assume: textual meaning does not exist in the past as a fact. Meaning is
mutually constituted by past and present, by the contemporary influences of the interpreter and her
life and times, and the tradition by which the text has been handed down from past to present. It
follows that textual meaning is not a fixed object resting in the past; because it is partially
constituted by the present, meaning necessarily varies with time. As the text moves forward

HILLARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 49-50 (1981) (criticizing metaphysical realism’s “God’s eye
point of view”). See also Mootz, Originalist Fixation, supra note 23, at 161-62 (“Apprehending a text as a static and
closed meaning from the past would require an interpreter from nowhere.”). But see generally THOMAS NAGEL, THE
VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986) (constructing a limited theory of “objective” understanding).
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through time, present concerns shift, combining with the past in different ways. 131 Formerly
present concerns become past, adding to the tradition that encases the text. New concerns in a new
present will always interact with an expanding textual tradition.
To save the fixation thesis, Professors Whittington and Solum both attempt to refute the
hermeneutic answer to the ontological question of textual meaning. Whittington argues that
hermeneutics contradicts fixation, while Professor Solum argues they are consistent. Despite these
logically opposite positions, Whittington and Solum misread Gadamer in the same way,
epistemologically rather than ontologically. Both misunderstand Gadamer’s metaphor of fusing
horizons as an illustration of the epistemological challenge of recovering the fixed original
meaning of a traditionary text like the Constitution, whereas Gadamer intends the metaphor to
illustrate what textual understanding is. Likewise, they misunderstand application as a procedure
divorced from interpretation and within one’s conscious control: one first uses originalist method
to interpret the text, to discover its objective meaning, and only thereafter does one apply that
meaning to solve a particular problem. Gadamer rejects the methodological exclusion of
application from interpretation, conceptualizing these as a single unified event of understanding.
One does not understand a text before its application, but in its application.
A. Horizons
1. Epistemological Horizons
Professor Whittington rejects outright that understanding has a circular structure.
Gadamer’s account of understanding, he contends, relies on “incommensurable conventions” and

See GADAMER, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 25, at 57. See also Mootz, Originalist Fixation, supra note 23, at 161
(“[N]o text can have an essential and unvarying meaning because it is appropriated continually by historically situated
readers.”).
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“convention-bound” interpretation. 132 He maintains that together these refute Gadamer’s argument
that the structure of textual understanding circles between past and present, and demonstrate the
inapplicability to textual interpretation of the metaphorical “fusion of horizons” Gadamer deploys
to illustrate understanding.
Drawing on E.D. Hirsch’s criticism of the horizonal metaphor, 133 Whittington understands
Gadamer to argue that a textual interpreter is trapped within her own interpretive horizon. 134 But
if the interpreter cannot see beyond her horizon, Whittington reasons, she can only sort out
disagreements within that horizon; interpretive questions rooted in other horizons would be
invisible. 135 Because “interpretation depends upon the resources of an interpretive tradition, it
cannot exceed that tradition.” 136
An interpreter trapped within her horizon, Whittington continues, cannot do what
interpretation so often requires. Existing horizonal conventions are only provisional starting points
which interpreters must leave behind to discover original meaning. 137 But if “text, interpretive
conventions, and reader” enable one to see beyond one’s own horizon to that of the text, they must
also enable recovery of the text’s original public meaning. 138 Whittington concludes that
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WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 102.
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E.D. HIRSCH, VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION app. II at 252-54 (1967).
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WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 103.

See WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 103 (citing HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD 99,
148, 200-07, 296, 340-44, 374, 390-95 (Sheed & Ward trans. Garett Barden & John Cumming ed. 1975) [hereinafter
GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD (1975)]; DAVID COUZENS HOY THE CRITICAL CIRCLE: LITERATURE, HISTORY, AND
PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS 50, 68-72 (1978)). Many of Whittington’s citations to Truth and Method seem
unrelated to the proposition that an interpreter is epistemologically limited by her horizon.
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Gadamer’s account is either wrong—it does not lead to textual understanding, because interpreters
cannot supersede their horizonal limits—or it is irrelevant—the resources which enable
interpreters to supersede horizonal limits also enable their recovery of original public meaning.139
The problem, Whittington reasons, is Gadamer’s dependence on Heidegger’s conception
of human existence as being-in-the-world. This “historicized nature of human understanding”
drastically underweights the influence of the text in the interpretive process, 140 allowing the
“reader’s interpretive presuppositions” to overwhelm it. Because the interpreter is apparently
trapped in her present horizon, walled off from the text, she is the sole source of textual meaning.
What Gadamer calls fusing one’s horizon with the text’s, Whittington calls “submersion” of the
text’s horizon into the interpreter’s: “the decontextualized text is brought into contact with the
overwhelming context of the reader,” and disappears. 141
The “only way” to maintain the text as an independent contributor to its meaning,
Whittington argues, is to recognize it as the repository of the author’s “contextualized
intentions.” 142 But again, if an interpreter recognizes the text as the representation of authorial
intention, the fusion metaphor fails “in both directions”: First, the text contributes nothing to the
fusion of horizons without the author’s intentions, but the need for fusion evaporates if the

139
WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 103-04. See also HIRSCH, supra note 133, at 254 (paragraph
indent deleted):

How can fusion take place unless the things to be fused are made actual, which is to say, unless the original
sense of the text has been understood? [H]ow can it be affirmed that the original sense of a text is beyond our
reach and, at the same time, that valid interpretation is possible? . . . If the interpreter is really bound by his
own historicity, he cannot break out of it into some halfway house where past and present are merged. [O]nce
it is admitted that the interpreter can adopt a fused perspective different from his own contemporary one, then
it is admitted in principle that he can break out of his own perspective.
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intentions are available through the text; and second, without original meaning there is nothing in
the horizon of the text to fuse with the interpreter’s present horizon, but if the resources within the
interpreter’s present horizon enable fusion with the horizon of the text, she can just as easily
discover the original meaning and forego the need for fusion. 143 “The idea of conceptual fusion
self-destructs as soon as textual content is taken into consideration, requiring that we abandon the
metaphor in favor of a more accurate description of textual interpretation.” 144
In contrast to Whittington, Professor Solum’s goal is to demonstrate the consistency of
fusion with fixation. 145 Solum agrees that we can only understand a traditionary text like the
Constitution from “our own perspective in the here and now.” Like Whittington, however, Solum
understands horizons as epistemological limits.146 Imprisoned within her own horizon, the
interpreter is susceptible to mistaken assumptions—for example, that the current semantic
meaning of a constitutional text is the same as its original semantic meaning. 147 The possibility of
error increases when the current semantic meaning is reinforced by a contemporary context that
was absent at adoption. For example, Solum suggests that
our understanding of what the word “cruel” means is necessarily influenced by
contemporary practices of punishment, including long periods of incarceration, that did not
exist at the time the Eighth Amendment was framed and ratified. We may not overcome
our assumptions about the meaning of the words “cruel” or “unusual,” and hence it is
143

Id.

144

Id.

Solum has elsewhere relied on Gadamer’s description of the hermeneutic circle, to respond to the claim that
originalism is not viable if the Constitution is viewed as an organic, intra-textual whole rather than a collection of
separate clauses. See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 1, at 107 (quoting GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD
(1975), supra note 135, at 264).
145

146
Solum, Originalism and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 22, at 147 (quoting GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra
note 21, at 316 (“[A] hermeneutical situation is determined by the prejudices that we bring with us. They constitute,
then, the horizon of a particular present, for they represent that beyond which it is impossible to see.”)).
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Solum, Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 22, at 148.
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always possible that we will mistake the late-eighteenth-century meaning of those
words. 148
Casting the interpreter’s horizon as an epistemological obstacle to discovery of the textual
horizon enables Solum to distinguish the interpreter’s beliefs about original public meaning from
the independently existing fact of original public meaning: “[O]ur understanding of original
meaning (as opposed to the original meaning itself) is always subject to change.” 149 Our beliefs
about original meaning are preconditioned by the traditions in which we are embedded, but neither
our interpretive preconceptions nor the traditions that engender them constitute the original
meaning.
The fusion of horizons, in Solum’s view, is asymptotic. New information about the original
semantic meaning and context illuminate more accurate ways of understanding traditionary texts,
understandings that more closely approach the fixed but sometimes elusive original meaning. 150
Indeed, the point of the fixation thesis is to force the engagement of our beliefs about original
meaning with the fact of this meaning, so as to make our understanding as accurate as possible.151
The interpreter’s horizon approaches the horizon of the text ever more closely, but it is only ever
the interpreter’s horizon that moves; as mandated by the fixation thesis, the textual horizon remains
the same, anchored in place by the semantics and context existing at adoption. Accordingly, Solum
concludes that “there is nothing in Gadamer’s hermeneutics that undermines the fixation thesis—
once that thesis is properly articulated and understood.” 152
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Id. See also id at 149 (“The fact that our knowledge of original meaning is imperfect does not entail that there is
no original meaning.”).
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2. Phenomenological Horizons
Both Whittington and Solum misunderstand the nature of the “horizons” whose fusion
produces textual meaning, by reading them as epistemological limits rather than phenomenological
expansions. They presuppose the ordinary language understanding of “horizon,” as the visual limit
beyond which a person standing at a fixed point cannot see. 153 Thus their premise that the
interpreter is always imprisoned within the epistemological boundary of her own (present) horizon.
Gadamer did not intend the generic understanding of “horizon” assumed by Whittington
and Solum, but the phenomenological one developed by Edmund Husserl. The principal exponent
of the phenomenological movement in the early 20th century, Husserl’s signature concept was the
“phenomenological reduction,” which—greatly simplified—sought to reduce philosophical
analysis to the phenomena of mental consciousness, while setting aside or “bracketing” the
question whether or how the objects of this consciousness relate to objects in the material world.154
The concept of “horizon” plays a critical role in Husserl’s account of perception. When we
directly observe an object in three-dimensional space, we can literally see only a part of it at any
one time. 155 Yet, Husserl maintains, our mental perception is of the entire object, not just the part

“Horizon,” in OED ONLINE (2018) (“The boundary or limit of any ‘circle’ or ‘sphere’ of view, thought, action,
etc. . . .; that which bounds one's mental vision or perception; limit or range of one's knowledge, experience, or
interest.”), available at http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/88458?rskey=zuXItr&result=1#eid.
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EDMUND HUSSERL, IDEAS PERTAINING TO A PURE PHENOMENOLOGY AND TO A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY
§ 33 at 65-66, § 52 at 117-18 (F. Kersten trans. 1982) (1913). See generally KENNEY, supra note 14, at 817.
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we directly observe. 156 We always perceive more than is directly given to our senses. 157 For
example, standing on the street we see the front side of a house, but not the back. We can move
around to the back, but any movement that brings the back side into view will preclude us from
directly observing the front. Yet our mental perception is of an entire house, not merely the front
wall.
How can this be? Husserl argued that our experience of houses and the contexts in which
they normally appear fills out what is missing from direct observation, 158 enabling us mentally to
perceive the entire house despite only a part being directly visible. So in a residential
neighborhood, we would be shocked to walk behind a house to discover the front exists as a mere
façade, even though from the front of the house we could see neither the entire neighborhood nor
the back of the house. But on a Hollywood backlot we’d be shocked to find a whole house behind
(what we would assume from the context is) a mere façade, again without ever having actually
seen more than the front of the façade. Our experience of houses and façades and the contexts in
which they normally appear fills in our perception in both cases, even though we cannot ever

See Henry Pietersma, Intuition and Horizon in the Philosophy of Husserl, 34 PHIL. & PHENOMEN. RES. 95, 99, 100
(1973):
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In perceiving a material object the subject does not see the object all at once. Yet Husserl insists that a
perceptual situation is a case of seeing the object itself . . . . Since the perceptual object is an external object
of a material sort . . . the subject is also aware that there is more to the object than what he actually perceives.
David Vessey, Gadamer and the Fusion of Horizons, 17 INT’L J. PHIL STUDIES 531, 533 (2009).
Heidegger calls this the “as” structure of interpretation: we always interpret something as something else,
within the web of relevant relations that constitute our world. See HEIDEGGER, BEING & TIME, supra note 24, at 189;
HEIDEGGER, METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS, supra note 62, at 127-28. A train whistle, for example, is always
perceived as a train, not as a sound simpliciter. Indeed, it requires extraordinary mental effort to hear a train whistle
and not perceive the train emitting it.
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directly observe the entirety of either all at once. The sum of these experiences and contexts is the
phenomenological horizon of the house or the façade. 159
For Husserl, therefore, the horizon of an object of perception is the opposite of a limit on
what one can see. To the contrary, a horizon contains more than can be seen directly or is otherwise
given to the senses. A phenomenological horizon expands the limits of sensory perception, rather
than bounding them.
Gadamer expressly adopts Husserl’s phenomenological horizon, adapting it from mental
perception to textual interpretation. 160 Accordingly, he emphasizes that “horizon” does not signify
a fixed epistemological limit to what one can understand of a text. 161 One can see beyond even a
perceptual horizon, simply by moving to higher ground. “Horizons change for a person who is

159
Cf. Vessey, supra note 157, at 534 (“Those aspects of an object that are not directly accessible to our senses, but
make it possible to see an object as an object, Husserl calls the object’s ‘horizon.’”).

E.g., GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 247 (“[T]he concept and phenomenon of the horizon is of
crucial importance for Husserl’s phenomenological research. With this concept, which we too shall have occasion to
use, Husserl is obviously seeking to capture the way all limited intentionality of meaning merges into the fundamental
continuity of the whole.”); id. at 464 & n.83 (“Seen phenomenologically, the “thing-in-itself” is, as Husserl has shown,
nothing but the continuity with which the various perceptual perspectives on objects shade into one another.”) (citing
HUSSERL, supra note 154, § 41); see Walter Lammi, Gadamer’s Debt to Husserl, 71 ANALECTA HUSSERLIANA:
YEARBOOK OF PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 167, 176 (A.T. Tymieniecka ed. 2001) (observing that Gadamer
understands “horizon” in terms of Husserl’s phenomenology). See also GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note19,
at 245 (“[W]e need to make room in our discussion for Husserl’s phenomenology.”).
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See GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 247 (“A horizon is not a rigid boundary but something that
moves with one and invites one to advance further.”); id. at 313:
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Since Nietzsche and Husserl, the word [“horizon”] has been used in philosophy to characterize the way in
which thought is tied to its finite determinacy, and the way one’s range of vision is gradually expanded. A
person who has no horizon does not see far enough and hence over-values what is nearest to him. On the
other hand, “to have a horizon” means not being limited to what is nearby but being able to see beyond it.
See also Dermot Moran, Gadamer and Husserl on Horizon, Intentionality, Intersubjectivity, and the Life-World, in 2
GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS AND THE ART OF CONVERSATION 73, 84 (A. Wierciński ed. 2011) (“Gadamer opposes
the view that horizons are mutually exclusive or that world views are hermetically sealed and nonporous . . . . Horizons
are not just limits but are essentially open to other horizons; they are moving boundaries.”)
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moving.” 162 Even without moving we usually know from experience what lies beyond. 163 As I’ve
explained, a phenomenological horizon includes all possible experiences of an object, not just
those we can see at one particular moment. Like a perceptual horizon, a phenomenological horizon
is not limited by what one sees from one fixed viewpoint, but includes everything knowledge and
experience tells her lies beyond. 164
Finally, we can enlarge our horizons figuratively. While our present horizon dictates
conventional understandings of texts, we are always aware—or can be made aware—that other
possible meanings exist. 165 The interpreter’s horizon is not fixed, but can expand to include the
horizons of others.
Whittington and Solum misunderstand the meaning of “horizon” in Truth and Method.
When the horizons of interpreter and text are understood as analogues to Husserl’s
phenomenologically expanded horizons, Whittington’s problem of horizonal imprisonment
disappears; the text always makes claims on the reader’s perspective which can never overwhelm
the text. Because the horizon is phenomenological not epistemological, there is always room for
the text to make its own claims. As Professor Mootz explains, the “text stands as a provocation
that cannot be wholly subordinated by the reader’s perspective.” 166 Likewise, there is no need to
overcome or compensate for an interpreter’s horizon, as Solum assumes, because it is not an
epistemological obstacle to textual understanding. The phenomenological understanding of
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“horizon” collapses Solum’s distinction between one’s beliefs about original meaning and the fact
of original meaning, and with it his conclusion that the fixation thesis coheres with philosophical
hermeneutics.
B. Interpretation/Application
The conceptual heart of Truth and Method is a section entitled, “The Recovery of the
Fundamental Hermeneutic Problem,” referring to both the problematic loss of application from
hermeneutic understanding, and the philosophical problem created by its restoration to a central
place in interpretation. 167
1. Application Restored
The biblical hermeneutics that emerged from the Reformation in the late 17th century
recognized three elements or modes of textual comprehension: “Understanding,” or the grasp of
obvious textual meaning; “interpretation” or exegesis, referring to the elucidation of textual
meaning not immediately evident on the face of the text; and “application,” or the deployment of
textual meaning to address problems of law, faith, and ethics. 168
The Romantics fused understanding and interpretation, arguing that interpretation is
always necessary for understanding. 169 This left application an afterthought to the main
interpretive event of articulating textual meaning in the abstract. Biblical hermeneutics, for
example, came to understand application of Biblical texts to theological problems as separate from
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GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 318-50.

Id. at 318. Gadamer emphasizes that these modes were not methods the interpreter deployed but “talents” she
possessed, requiring a certain “finesse of mind.” Id.
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Id. See also id. at 185-86 (summarizing Schleiermacher’s argument that the normal consequence of textual
understanding is misunderstanding, which interpretation must correct.).
169
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exegesis of their meaning. 170 Application became a subsidiary procedure which had its place
elsewhere and after understanding/interpretation.
By contrast, Gadamer melds application with the Romantic unity of textual
understanding/interpretation, so as to combine understanding/interpretation/application into a
single event of textual comprehension. Whereas the Romantics claimed that understanding is
always interpretation, Gadamer argues that understanding is always interpretation and application:
[U]nderstanding always involves something like the application of the text to be
understood in the present situation of the interpreter. Thus we are forced to go, as it were,
one stage beyond romantic hermeneutics, by regarding not only understanding and
interpretation, but also application as comprising one unified process. [W]e consider
application to be just as integral a part of the hermeneutical process as are understanding
and interpretation. 171
Gadamer’s use of “application” is easily misunderstood. In the ordinary sense of
application, a person takes a principle and deploys it to a particular situation involving someone
or something else—i.e., a situation the interpreter is figuratively standing “outside” of. For
example, the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education extracted a principle of racial equality
from the Equal Protection Clause and applied it to invalidate the practice of government-mandated
segregation in public education, 172 But many of the Justices have remained notoriously bad at
hiring African American law clerks, 173 even as they have expanded the application of Brown to a

E.g., id.at 318 (After Schleiermacher, the “edifying application of Scripture in Christian preaching . . . seemed
very different from the historical and theological understanding of it.”).
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Id. at 318-19 (emphasis added).
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347 U.S. 483 (1954).

For example, in 33 years on the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not hire a single African American clerk. Of
the scores of law clerks hired by Justice Ginsburg since her appointment to the Court in 1993, only one has been
African American. See Mark Joseph Stern, The Supreme Court Is Terrible at Hiring Diverse Law Clerks, but Neil
Gorsuch Is Surprisingly Good at It, Slate (Apr. 16, 2018), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2018/04/the-supremecourt-is-terrible-at-hiring-diverse-law-clerks-but-neil-gorsuch-is-surprisingly-good-at-it.html.
173

39

wide range of government discrimination. These Justices have not applied to themselves the
principle of Brown they apply to others.
This is not what Gadamer means by “application.” A Gadamerian interpreter is always
interpreting herself along with the text. No interpretation is free from the interests of the interpreter;
this follows from the constitution of textual meaning by the present as well as the past. Every
interpreter is standing within a situation; when she applies the text to that situation, therefore, she
applies it to herself. “[T]o understand a text always means to apply it to ourselves . . . .” 174
As I’ve discussed, 175 the canonical status of Brown has placed its holding beyond
questioning by the legal academic mainstream. As Judge Bork lamented, even the great Professor
Wechsler was attacked for his suggestion that Brown lacked a neutral doctrinal justification. 176
Interpreting Brown to place public school desegregation outside the original public meaning of the
Equal Protection Clause would have rendered it illegitimate by Bork’s own interpretive lights,
saying as much about new-originalist theory and Bork himself as about Brown. When he
interpreted Brown, Bork could not avoid also interpreting himself and public-meaning originalism,
knowing that only one interpretation of Brown and the Equal Protection Clause could preserve the
mainstream bona fides of both his reputation and his preferred interpretive methodology.
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Id. at 416; accord GADAMER, HERMENEUTICS, supra note 25, at 55 (“In the last analysis, all understanding is selfunderstanding.”).
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See supra notes 110-11and accompanying text.

BORK, supra note 1, at 78-79 (discussing Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 31-35 (1959)).
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For Gadamer, then, a text is not understandable without its applications to its interpreter,
because the text’s meaning is those applications. 177 Gadamer could hardly be clearer about this
unity: “Understanding here is always application.” 178
2. Application Is Interpretation
Having committed himself to the unity understanding/interpretation/application, Gadamer
moves to the philosophical problem this unity creates: we can only “apply” something we already
possess, but it seems to follow from understanding/interpretation/application that we do not
possess textual meaning before the application that partially constitutes this unity. Gadamer turns
to two sources to illustrate this problem and its solution: Aristotle’s Ethics and its account of ethical
or moral knowledge, 179 and legal interpretation and its identity with historical interpretation. 180
a. Aristotelian Ethics. Gadamer reads the Ethics to show that we are not subjects separated
from moral knowledge as an object, as if it were a skill we could learn first and then apply. Rather,
in ethical situations,
we are always already in the situation of having to act . . . , and hence we must already
possess and be able to apply moral knowledge. That is why the concept of application is
highly problematical. For we can only apply something that we already have; but we do
not possess moral knowledge in such a way that we already have it and then apply it to
specific situations. 181

E.g., GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 321-22 (“The meaning of a law that emerges in its normative
application is fundamentally no different form the meaning reached in understanding a text.”); id. at 338 (“The work
of interpretation is to concretize the law in each specific case—i.e., it is a work of application.”).
177

Id. at 320. See also id. at xxix (“[A]pplication is an element of understanding itself.”); id. at 321-22 (“To distinguish
between a normative function and a cognitive one is to separate what clearly belong together. [D]iscovering the
meaning of a legal text and discovering how to apply it in a particular legal instance are not two separate actions, but
one unitary process.”); id. at 421 (“[U]nderstanding always includes an element of application . . . .”).

178

Id. at 322-33 (discussing Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics (W.E. Ross trans.) [hereinafter Aristotle, Ethics], in
WORKS OF ARISTOTLE, supra note 14, at 935-1112 i-x 1094a1-1181b25.
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GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 334-39.

181

Id. at 327.
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Gadamer will argue that grasping the meaning of a traditionary text is like making ethical
decisions; just as moral knowledge arises from the particularities of the agent and the situation
calling her to act, so textual meaning is a function of both the interpreter in the present and the
traditionary text from the past. In neither case can universal rules govern the crucial event of moral
decision or textual understanding. 182
The Ethics emphasizes the importance of the moral agent’s particularity to ethical decision
making. The quality of one’s education is important to the acquisition of moral knowledge,
because we judge well the things we know. 183 But so also is the content of one’s character. How
to act rightly in a situation depends on the actor’s experience of prior situations and the character
she developed by acting in these situations. 184 Education is less important for the abstract
knowledge it imparts than for the character it develops. Who we are determines what we can
understand of a situation calling for action, and what we understand of such a situation determines
how we will act in it. 185 Whether education or experience, the capacity to judge what a situation
requires of us depends on something we already have or know. 186

182
Gadamer reads the Ethics to have liberated moral decision making from Platonic metaphysics, by showing that the
good exists only in human action rather than as a general abstraction. Id. at 322-23 (citing Aristotle, Ethics, supra note
179, at 937-38 i.4). The basis for moral knowledge is a conscious effort to do the right thing, not just to think it; this
doing eventually orients one’s habits and character to the good. See GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at
323.
183

Aristotle, Ethics, supra note 179, at 936 i.3 1094b28-1095a2, 937 i.4 1095b3.

184

Id. at 952 ii.1 1103a16-17, 953 1103b14-17:
[M]oral virtue comes about as the result of habit. [B]y doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other
men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being
habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly.

See also id. at 953 1103b27-31 (“[W]e must examine the nature of actions . . . for these determine also the nature of
the states of character that are produced . . . .”).
185

Carl Page, Hermeneutics and Practical Rationality, 27 INT’L PHIL. Q. 81, 93 (1987).

See Aristotle, Ethics, supra note 179, at 937-38 i.4 1095b6-8 (“For the fact is the starting point . . . and the man
who has been well brought up has or can easily get starting points.”).
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Because of the dependence of moral knowledge on individual character, one cannot acquire
it by learning universal rules, as in the study of geometry or physics. “Matters concerned with
conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity.” 187 This refers to the variability of the
situation as well as of the agent; as Gadamer observes, “What is right . . . cannot be fully
determined independently of the situation that requires a right action from me.” 188 Moral
knowledge is thus a function of the particularities of both the agent called upon to act and the
situation calling for action.
The dependence of moral knowledge on particularities is an insightful analogy showing
the impossibility of method in the human sciences. Scientific knowledge is abstract, detached
from any particular person, time, or place, whereas knowledge in the human sciences (as in, for
example, the acquisition of moral knowledge) is qualitatively different because of its dependence
on particularity. 189 As we’ve seen, 190 Gadamer argues that the interpreter can only approach
traditionary texts as the person she is within the textual traditions which both form and are formed
by her. The Ethics illustrates for Gadamer the folly of method, because in understanding “the
knower is not standing over against a situation that he merely observes,” but “is directly confronted

187

.

Id. at 953 ii.2 1104a4-5 (emphasis added).

188
GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 327-28. See also id. at 323 (“If man always encounters the good
in the form of the particular practical situation in which he finds himself, the task of moral knowledge is to determine
what the concrete situation asks of him . . . .”).
189

Id. at 324 (emphasis deleted):
We spoke of the interpreter’s belonging to the tradition he is interpreting, and we saw that understanding
itself is a historical event. The alienation of the interpreter from the interpreted by the objectifying methods
of modern science, characteristic of the hermeneutics and historiography of the nineteenth century, appeared
as the consequence of a false objectification.

190

See supra text accompanying notes 102-29.
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with what he sees.” 191 The knowledge he acquires is not just something he knows, but “something
he has to do.” 192 The textual interpreter is likewise never standing outside the tradition in which
the text has been handed down to the present, nor the situation in which the text is to be
understood/interpreted/applied, but must determine textual meaning while standing within both
horizons.
Gadamer formalizes this analogy with an exegesis of book vi of the Ethics, in which
Aristotle famously defines and contrasts the intellectual virtues, including scientific knowledge
(epistēmē), craft or skill (technē), and practical wisdom (phronēsis). 193 Gadamer is keen to show
that practical wisdom, rather than science or craft, is the epistemological model for the human
sciences. His analysis of these differences is intricate and complex, but the conclusion is familiar:
in acquiring scientific knowledge the observing subject is separated from the object of knowledge,
and in using a skill the making subject is distinct from the object she makes, but in exercising
practical wisdom the agent is defined and constituted by how she chooses and acts. 194 Scientific
and technical knowledge always involve something like the application of an a priori universal
rule to a separate and subsequent particular situation, whereas practical wisdom only emerges in
the actions chosen in particular situations. 195

191

GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 324.

192

Id.

193

Id. at 324-33 (discussing Aristotle, Ethics, supra note 179, at 1022-36 vi).

JAMES RISSER, HERMENEUTICS AND THE VOICE OF THE OTHER: RE-READING GADAMER’S PHILOSOPHICAL
HERMENEUTICS 106 (1997); Paul Schuchman, Aristotle’s Phronēsis and Gadamer’s Hermeneutics, 23 PHIL. TODAY
41, 43-44 (1979).
194

195
Aristotle, Ethics, supra note 179, at 1033 vi.9 1143a32-35 (“[N]ot only must the man of practical wisdom know
particular facts, but understanding and judgement are also concerned with things to be done . . . .”). See also
Schuchman, supra note 194, at 43 (“Moral knowledge . . . is not a knowledge of goodness as such in its essential and
unchanging structure.”); Catherine H. Zuckert, Hermeneutics in Practice: Gadamer on Ancient Philosophy, in
CAMBRIDGE GADAMER, supra note 92, at 201, 212:
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Gadamer concludes that the Ethics models the problem of application and its solution,196
in three ways:
(i) The moral agent’s understanding of what an ethical situation demands of her is
not the later application of a predetermined good, but co-determines the good from the
beginning. 197 This parallels Gadamer’s hermeneutic conclusion that textual understanding
is always application—that is, the character of the textual interpreter, and the occasion and
motivation for her interpretation, necessarily contribute to the meaning of the text.
(ii) Because the good of an action is partially constituted by its applications, it
cannot be determined in the abstract as a universal rule, but must respond directly to the
demands of the situation. 198 Similarly, the meaning of a text cannot first be established in
the abstract and then applied to a particular interpretive problem; rather, interpretation,
application, and understanding occur simultaneously in a single event.
(iii) Because a good action depends on both the demands of the situation and the
character of the agent, the agent must not ignore her own particularity, which is the only
way she can understand what the situation ethically demands of her. Likewise, because we

Knowledge of the good is not like other forms of knowledge; it does not consist of generalizations
from empirical data or experiences, nor does it constitute the application of general rules to particular
situations, nor it is [sic] deductive like geometry . . . . It does not . . . involve cognition of an abstract or selfsubsisting “idea” of the kind Aristotle criticizes in his works on ethics.
196

GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 333.

Id. at 333 (Like Aristotle, “[w]e too determined that application is neither a subsequent nor merely an occasional
part of the phenomenon of understanding, but codetermines it as a whole from the beginning.).
197

Id. at 333 (“Here too [as in the Ethics,] application did not consist in relating some pregiven universal to the
particular situation.”).
198
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have no access to an “objective” understanding of a text, we can only understand the text
in the traditional context in which it has been handed down, as the people we already are. 199
b. Legal Interpretation. Before Gadamer, the hermeneutic tradition had confined legal and
biblical hermeneutics to a specialized domain because of their “dogmatic” purposes—resolving
particular cases conforming to law, generating biblical meaning conforming to Christian doctrine
and belief. 200 “Dogma” here means something more and different than apologetic adherence to
pre-ordained meaning; it has the sense of a norm “in force.” 201 Well into the 20th century, both
legal and biblical hermeneutics proceeded on the assumption that the object of interpretation—the
law or the Bible—is normatively binding on the interpreter, but this did not require that legal or
biblical interpretation conform to fore-ordained understandings. 202 For example, the patristic
tradition did not constrain Luther’s interpretation of biblical texts, because he rejected the tradition.
But Luther still believed the Bible is true, which constrained his biblical interpretation in other
ways. 203
When Gadamer writes of the “dogmatic” orientation of legal hermeneutics, he is using the
word in this second sense, to refer to the binding quality of legal norms. Legal interpretation always
proceeds on the assumption that there exists valid law applicable to the interpretive situation. To
decide a case, the judge must always ascertain the law “in force.” Gadamer argues that the

199
Id. at 333 (“In order to understand [a] text’s meaning and significance, [an interpreter] must not try to disregard
himself and his particular hermeneutical situation. He must relate the text to this situation if he wants to understand at
all.”).
200

Id. at 337.

WEINSHEIMER, supra note 53, at 192. See also id. at 135 (“[D]ogmatic interpretation is the endeavor to understand
the past as still true, still in force . . . .”).

201
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GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 319; see WEINSHEIMER, supra note 53, at 134-36.
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See id. at 142-43.
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dogmatic purpose of legal interpretation does not justify its confinement to law as a special
hermeneutics, but actually makes it the model for a general hermeneutics applicable to all of the
human sciences. There always exists a live preconception which precedes and contributes to
textual meaning.
In contrast to its treatment of law, the hermeneutic tradition understood history as a human
science governed by the general hermeneutics of method. 204 So Gadamer proposes to show that
law is a general hermeneutic model for history (and thus the other human sciences) by
demonstrating that law and legal history each interpret the same objects—laws and judicial
decisions—in the same way. The judge reads laws and decisions to resolve the case before her,
but they are also sources for the writing of legal history. 205 The judge ascertains the original
meaning of laws only as a means to the end of deciding the case before her, whereas the historian
wants to know the original meaning for its own sake, to determine its historical significance.
Gadamer rejects that the proposition that law and history proceed by reconstructing and
applying only original meaning. 206 The historian cannot understand a law, he argues, unless she
assembles all of its applications over the course of its existence, because
[i]t is only in all its applications that the law becomes concrete. Thus the legal historian cannot
be content to take the original application of the law as determining its original meaning. As a
historian he will, rather, have to take account of the historical change that the law has
undergone. In understanding, he will have to mediate between the original application and the
present application of the law. 207

Gadamer makes the same argument with respect to theology. GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 33945. He observes that literary and art criticism seem to have been overtaken by method, but later concludes that—as in
law, history, and theology—application in literary and art criticism is application to oneself. Id. at 346-49.

204

205

Id. at 334.

206

Id. at 335-37.

207

Id.
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This means, for example, that a legal historian does not understand the historical significance of
the 14th Amendment historically by focusing on its original meaning in 1868 or its first application
by the Supreme Court in 1873; 208 she must instead identify all of the Court’s applications of the
Amendment down to the present, including Brown, before she can understand it historically.
Similarly, it is impossible for a legal historian to ascertain the original meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause as if he were unaware of both Brown’s interpretation of the clause, and that
interpretation’s subsequent canonization.
Nor does Gadamer believe the judge merely applies the law’s original meaning to resolve
her cases. 209 One must distinguish the original meaning from the meaning applied in current
practice, because the judge determines what the law means when she applies it to the case before
her. 210 Though she must know the original meaning to decide her case, yet she is not bound by
it. 211 In deciding her case, she must instead “take account of the change in circumstances and hence
define afresh the normative function of the law.” 212 To return to the 14th Amendment, the Court in
Brown recognized that the original understanding of the Equal Protection Clause would not have
required desegregation. So the Court held the original understanding irrelevant; it did not consider
itself bound by the original meaning, and interpreted the Equal Protection Clause based on

208
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (5-4 dec.) (controversially construing the rights protected by
the 14th Amendment in extremely narrow fashion).
209

GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note19, at 336.
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Id.

211

Id.

Id. See also GADAMER, AGE OF SCIENCE, supra note 25, at 126 (“[T]he correct interpretation of a law is presupposed
in its application. To that extent one can say that each application of a law goes beyond the mere understanding of its
legal sense and fashions a new reality.”) (emphasis added).
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decisions decided since ratification, especially those in the immediately preceding years. 213 The
Court “defined afresh” the meaning of the clause.
The “hermeneutical situation” of judge and historian, therefore, is the same: Seeking to
understand a law, they each have an immediate expectation of meaning—that is, some apparently
controlling preconception. Each must account for the change in circumstances between the law’s
origin and its present. As Gadamer sums up,
There can be no such thing as a direct access to the historical object [represented by the law]
that would objectively reveal its historical value. The historian has to undertake the same
reflection as the jurist . . . . Historical knowledge can be gained only by seeing the past in its
continuity with the present—which is exactly what the jurist does in his practical, normative
work of “ensuring the unbroken continuance of law and preserving the tradition of the legal
idea.” 214
From here, Gadamer argues that judges and legal historians not only have the same task,
but legal interpretation represents the precise relationship between past and present that exists in
historical interpretation and in all of the human sciences. 215 To “understand” and to “interpret”
means more than merely to “discover and recognize a valid meaning”; 216 understanding and
interpretation connect the origins of the law as they have been handed down in legal tradition, with

E.g., McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (African American graduate student admitted to
university could not be made to sit in segregated portions of classrooms, library, or cafeteria.); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950) (Newly established state law school for African Americans could not provide legal education equal
to that provided by segregated University of Texas Law School.).
213

GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 336 (quoting & translating EMILIO BETTI, ZUR GRUNDLEGUNG
EINER ALLGEMEINEN AUSLEGUNGSLEHRE 91 n.14b (1954)); GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, supp. I at
214

532-35 (discussing and criticizing Betti’s hermeneutic position as rooted in the discredited Romantic quest for
objective interpretive method). The essentials of Betti’s hermeneutics are set forth in English in Betti, Hermeneutics,
supra note 53.
215

GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 337.

216

Id.
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the present understanding of the law. 217 The judge is of course concerned with the “legal
significance of the law—and not the historical significance of the law’s promulgation or of
particular cases of its application . . . .” 218 But even though the judge is not a historian, she must
be conscious of the history of the law as it has come to be understood in the present. 219 Asking,
“How did the law arrive at its current state?” is identical to asking, “What is the law?”
While the legal historian does not need to use the law to resolve a particular case, neither
can she disregard it. 220 A person trying to understand the law from its original meaning cannot
ignore the continuing effect of the law as it has moved through time. 221 But this is true of any
text—it always needs to be restated in terms of the present. 222 “[H]istorical understanding always
implies that the tradition reaching us speaks into the present and must be understood in this
mediation—indeed as this mediation.” 223 Historical understanding is the mediation of past and
present, the fusion of the horizon of the text with the horizon of the interpreter, 224 just as is legal
understanding.
Finally, Gadamer tests his conclusion. Since belonging to a tradition is a condition of

Id. (“The judge seeks to be in accord with the ‘legal idea’ in mediating it with the present.”); GADAMER, AGE OF
SCIENCE, supra note 25, at 82 (“Finding the law means thinking the case together with the law so that what is actually
just or the law gets concretized.”).
217
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GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 337.
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Id. (The judge’s “orientation is not that of a historian, but he has an orientation to his own history, which is his
present.”).
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Id.
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Cf. id. (The law presents the historian “with the questions that he has to ask of historical tradition.”).

222
Id. at 337-38 (“Inasmuch as the actual object of historical understanding is not events but their ‘significance,’ it is
clearly an incorrect description of this understanding [i.e., of the text in terms of the present] to speak of an object
existing in itself and of the subject’s approach to it.”).
223

Id. at 338.
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See supra text accompanying notes 120-29.
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understanding in the human sciences, 225 this must also be the case in legal hermeneutics if it is an
exemplar of hermeneutics in all of these disciplines. The tradition through which the text is handed
down to the present conditions one’s preconceptions of its meaning. In legal interpretation, the
tradition is the rule of law. Gadamer focuses here on familiar the rule-of-law principles of
generality, that “the law is binding on all members of the community in the same way,” 226 and
public enactment and promulgation, which make law “irrevocable and binding.” 227 As we have
seen, the need of the judge to understand the law arises from its dogmatic character of being “in
force.” At the same time, the judge is subject to the law like everyone else. 228
The rule-of-law tradition holds that “the legal order is recognized as valid for everyone and
that no one is exempt from it.” 229 One does not apply the law “from the outside,” as if the judge
were untouched by the case calling for decision. Rather, all judges by definition belong to this
tradition, so the judge’s application of the law in a particular case is always application of the law
to herself. It is also always possible for the judge to understand any supplement to the original
understanding of the law as part of the law currently in force, because such supplements are part
of the tradition in which the law is encased and handed down to the judge:
It is part of the idea of a rule of law that the judge’s judgment does not proceed from an arbitrary
and unpredictable decision, but from the just weighing up of the whole. This is why in a state
governed by law, there is legal certainty . . . . Every lawyer and every counsel is able, in
principle, to give correct advice—i.e., he can accurately predict the judge’s decision on the
basis of existing laws. 230
225

See supra text accompanying and following note130.
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Id. 338.
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Id. at 339. See also id. (“[I]t is always possible to grasp the existing legal order as such—i.e., to assimilate
dogmatically any past supplement to the law.”).
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*

*

*

Truth and Method calls on Aristotelian ethics and legal judgment to show that the
application of textual meaning includes its application to oneself. Application is thus a constituent
of textual meaning, not the belated appropriation of an abstract meaning “discovered” earlier and
elsewhere, because application to oneself necessarily adds the concerns of the interpreter in the
present to interpretation of the text from the past. Application co-determines one’s understanding
of both an ethical situation and a text. Just as application does not consist in applying some
pregiven ethical rule to an objectified situation, so also the interpreter dealing with a traditionary
text does not take the text as a universal that she first understands abstractly, and only afterwards
applies to particular problems. 231 And just as an ethical decision is a constituent of the moral
agent’s character, so also an interpreter understands the text through its application to herself and
her situation. 232
Like Aristotelian ethics, legal interpretation is a model of hermeneutic understanding for
all of the human sciences. 233 To properly decide a case, the judge must mediate the original
meaning and the concerns of the present in an application that reflects on her as well as her case.
But this is what application means in all of the human sciences; all interpretive activity requires
an awareness of the effect of history, of how applications of a text through time alter both the text’s
original meaning and the interpreter’s understanding of herself in relation to the text.234 As

Id. at 333. See also Leiter, supra note 69, at 280-81 (“There is much in human judgment and action that is possible
only because of practical skills and competence that remain beyond the reach of theoretical articulation.”).
231
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GADAMER, TRUTH & METHODS, supra note 19, at 333. See also Mootz, Originalist Fixation, supra note 23, at 166
(“All historical understanding is a play of objectivity and subjectivity.”).
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GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 334.
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Id. at 358-59:
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Gadamer concludes, “Application does not mean first understanding a given universal in itself and
then afterward applying it to a concrete case. It is the very understanding of the universal—the
text. Understanding proves to be a kind of effect . . . .” 235
3. Application in Public-Meaning Originalism
Professors Whittington and Solum reject Gadamer’s unity of understanding/
interpretation/application. They argue that the application of textual meaning is separate from and
subsequent to the textual interpretation that yields the meaning to be applied. As before,
Whittington is concerned to show that the unity of interpretation and application is simply wrong,
while Solum is preoccupied with demonstrating its consistency with the fixation thesis. Their
arguments show that they do not understand application and the place it occupies in philosophical
hermeneutics.
Whittington contends that the unity understanding/interpretation/application contradicts
the “everyday experience of interpreting texts.” 236 This experience suggests that specific
applications change over time, but the general principle one applies does not. 237 Examples and
explanations are not to the contrary; they deepen understanding of the underlying principle, but
When a judge regards himself as entitled to supplement the original meaning of a text of a law, he is doing
exactly what takes place in all other understanding. The old unity of hermeneutical disciplines comes into its
own again if we recognize that historically effected consciousness is at work in all hermeneutical activity . .
..
235

Id. at 359.

236

WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 104.
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Id.:
Quite often . . . we must formulate and understand a general principle before specific applications can be
considered, let alone resolved . . . . Our understandings are not set, in the sense of being unrevisable in the
face of error, but neither are they essentially tied to applications such that every application results in a new,
equally valid, and potentially contradictory understanding.

See also id. (“Even after an application is made, the meaning of the text remains the same, though it is now more
explicit.”).
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remain contingent illustrations which do not touch its content.238 At all times, “understanding and
explanation remain distinct components of interpretation.” 239
Whittington concedes that applications of the Constitution enhance our understanding of it
by elongating the list of particular circumstances governed by the general fixed constitutional
principle. They also illuminate previously unrecognized dimensions of a constitutional principle
when it is applied to new situations. 240 But adding particular dimensions to the general
understanding or extending the general understanding to novel situations merely highlights a
previously unnoticed aspect of the text. 241
To grasp Solum’s argument, one must first understand the specialized meanings of
“interpretation” and “construction.” Like most public-meaning originalists, 242 Solum divides the
process of ascertaining constitutional meaning into empirical and normative components.
Constitutional “interpretation” is empirical, as we have seen, consisting of the recovery of the
public meaning fixed by semantics and context at the time of adoption. 243
Constitutional “construction,” by contrast, is the process of applying the fixed original
constitutional meaning recovered by interpretation to resolve particular cases. 244 Over time,
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Id. 104.
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Id.
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Id. 105:
Each generation must read the Constitution for itself and its own concerns, but such situated readings do not
produce new texts; rather, they fill in the text that has always existed. The application of the text expands
along two dimensions, as particular meanings of a general text are cataloged and as the known meaning finds
new significance . . . .
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WHITTINGTON, CONSTRUCTION, supra note 21, at 5.
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construction develops rules and doctrines which may not be evident from the interpreted
constitutional text alone. Unlike interpretation, which is empirical, construction is normative, the
activity of applying original fixed meaning to ever-changing situations. 245 Solum explains that
construction consists of creating “doctrines of constitutional law” and determining “decisions of
constitutional cases . . . associated with (or required by)” the constitutional meaning uncovered by
interpretation. 246 Whittington likewise states, “Something external to the text—whether political
principle, social interest, or partisan consideration—must be alloyed with it in order for the text to
have a determinate and controlling meaning within a given governing context.” 247
With the interpretation-construction distinction in mind, Solum quotes two long passages
from Truth and Method. 248 From these Solum constructs a syllogism which purports to
Statutory “construction” has long been a part of legal interpretation, but its application to the Constitution
was only recently theorized, primarily in the early work of Professor Whittington. See WHITTINGTON,
INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 5-7; WHITTINGTON, CONSTRUCTION, supra note 21. See also infra note 248
245

Id. at 6; Solum, Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 22, at 134-35.

Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORD. L. REV. 453, 457 (2013) [hereinafter
Solum, Originalism & Construction].
Because construction is a fundamentally political process that projects meaning onto the text, Whittington
considers it fundamentally inconsistent incompatible with the judicial role of interpreting the Constitution.
WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 5–6. He thus confines construction to the political branches. Id. at
7; WHITTINGTON, CONSTRUCTION, supra note 21, at 6–7. Later theorists, however—including most public-meaning
originalists—have embraced construction as a necessary and legitimate part of judicial decision making in
constitutional disputes. See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 300–12 (2011); BARNETT, THE LOST
CONSTITUTION, supra note 1, at 121–30 (2004); Solum, Originalism & Construction, supra, at 248.
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See Solum, Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 22, at 146 (quoting GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD,
supra note 19, at 336, 338-39):

It is true that the jurist is always concerned with the law itself, but he determines its normative content in
regard to the given case to which it is to be applied. In order to determine this content exactly, it is necessary
to have historical knowledge of the original meaning, and only for this reason does the judge concern himself
with the historical value that the law has through the act of legislation. But he cannot let himself be bound by
what, say, an account of the parliamentary proceedings tells him about the intentions of those who first passed
the law. Rather, he has to take account of the change in circumstances and hence define afresh the normative
function of the law.
...
The work of interpretation is to concretize the law in each specific case—i.e., it is a work of
application. The creative supplementing of the law that is involved is a task reserved to the judge, but he is
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demonstrate that Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics incorporates—or, at least, co-exists
with—the fixation thesis:
1. The translators of Truth and Method used “interpretation” to signify “construction,”
which by definition includes application of the law to individual cases. 249
2. The substitution of “construction” for “interpretation” makes clear that Gadamer
presupposes the new-originalist distinction between “interpretation” and
“construction.” 250
a. Philosophical hermeneutics entails the recovery of original textual meaning by
an act of interpretation, 251 and then
b. Application of this recovered meaning to particular cases by an act of
construction. 252
3. The fixation thesis is presupposed by acts of interpretation, but unaffected by acts of
construction. 253
Therefore, Gadamerian hermeneutics incorporates (or can co-exist with) the fixation
thesis. 254
4. New-Originalist Errors

subject to the law in the same way as is every other member of the community. It is part of the idea of a rule
of law that the judge’s judgment does not proceed from an arbitrary and unpredictable decision, but from the
just weighing up of the whole. Anyone who has immersed himself in the particular situation is capable of
undertaking this just weighing-up. This is why in a state governed by law, there is legal certainty—i.e., it is
in principle possible to know what the exact situation is. Every lawyer and every counsel is able, in principle,
to give correct advice—i.e., he can accurately predict the judge’s decision on the basis of existing laws.
See Solum, Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 22, at 146 (“Notice that the English word used by
the translators, ‘interpretation,’ is used to express the concept that I have represented by the word ‘construction.’”).
249

250

See id. (“Gadamer’s text seems to presuppose the interpretation-construction distinction as a conceptual matter.”).

251

See id. (Gadamer’s “account of interpretation (in the sense stipulated here) focuses on original meaning . . . .”).

See id. at 146-47 (Gadamer “clearly distinguishes between the recovery of original meaning (‘interpretation’) and
the application of the text to a particular case (‘construction’).”).
252

253
See id. at 142 (“The fixation thesis is a claim about constitutional interpretation; it is not a claim about constitutional
construction.”).
254

See id. at 147 (“[I]t would seem that [Gadamer] accepts the fixation thesis.”).
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As they misunderstood the meaning of “horizon,” Professors Whittington and Solum both
misunderstand the meaning of “application” in philosophical hermeneutics. They take it to mean
the disembodied deployment of a universal abstract principle to a particular concrete situation,
whereas Gadamer intends “application” to be application to oneself, as illustrated by his
discussions of Aristotle’s Ethics and the exemplary character of legal interpretation. 255
Professor Whittington assumes a Cartesian ontology of knowledge, with its strict
separation of knowing subject from object of knowledge. 256 The end is ordained by this beginning:
Gadamer’s account of textual understanding is not plausible on Cartesian premises, and this is
what Whittington shows; Gadamer himself would have agreed. Solum also presupposes a
Cartesian ontology, despite his insistence that the fixation thesis is consistent with Gadamer’s antiCartesian ontology. The important question here is whether Cartesian premises are plausible
starting points for an account of textual understanding. I take this up in Part IV.
As for Professor Solum’s attempt at reconciliation, he fails to show the compatibility of
the fixation thesis with Gadamer’s account of textual understanding, and specifically with the unity
understanding/interpretation/application. 257 Each premise of his argument is wrong. 258
First, the translators of Truth and Method did not use “interpretation” to signify
“construction” in the passage Solum quoted as evidence of Gadamer’s purported incorporation of
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See supra Part II-B.

256

See supra text accompanying notes 61-63.

Solum calls his analysis of Truth and Method a “reconstruction” of Gadamer’s argument rather than an “exegesis.”
Solum, Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 22, at 147. But refashioning Gadamer’s argument to make
it fit with the fixation thesis demonstrates nothing (except perhaps Gadamer’s own thesis that the horizon of Solum as
interpreter—e.g., a commitment to the fixation thesis—is a co-determinant of textual meaning—e.g., the meaning of
“application” in Truth and Method). Accordingly, I have treated Solum’s analysis of application as his good-faith
understanding of the arguments Gadamer actually makes, and not his reformulation of them to suit his purposes.
257

258

See supra text accompanying notes 249-54.
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the interpretation/construction distinction in Truth and Method. 259 The German word rendered
“interpretation” in the English translation is Auslegen. 260 Auslegen means “interpretation,” 261 as
the translators were no doubt aware. There was no mistranslation into English, and no warrant for
reading “interpretation” in these passages as “construction.” Solum has simply read the neworiginalist definition of “construction” into “interpretation” in one sentence of Truth and Method
to make his argument work, without explaining what the scores of references to “interpretation”
mean elsewhere in the book. 262
Second, and more importantly, Gadamer’s account of interpretation does not separate the
empirical function of interpretation—what does the text mean?—from the normative function of
application—how should the text apply? For Gadamer, these are the same question. This

See Solum, Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 22, at 146 (“Notice that the English word used by
the translators, ‘interpretation,’ is used to express the concept that I have represented by the word ‘construction.’”).
Presumably Solum is referring to the appearance of “interpretation” in the language he quoted from Truth and Method
at the outset of his argument. See supra note 249. The relevant passage is:
259

It is true that the judge is always concerned with the law itself, but he determines its normative content in
regard to a given case to which it is applied. [H]e has to take account of the change in circumstances and
hence define afresh the normative function of the law . . . . The work of interpretation is to concretize the law
in each specific case—i.e., it is a work of application. The creative supplementing of the law that is involved
is a task reserved to the judge . . . .
GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 336, 338 (italics in original, underlining added).
Compare HANS-GEORG GADAMER, WARHHEIT UND METHODE 312 (3rd ed. 1972) (“Die Aufgabe des Auslegens ist
. . . .”) (underlining added) with GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 338 (“The work of interpretation is
. . . .”) (underlining added).
260

See “Auslegung,” & “-en,” in THE OXFORD-DUDEN GERMAN DICTIONARY, supra note 56, at 109. The primary
definition is “to lay out,” id., which Heidegger put to good use in Being and Time, defining “interpretation as “to lay
out one’s possibilities.” See supra text accompanying notes 72-73.
261

If anything , in Truth and Method “interpretation” always means new-originalist “construction,” because for
Gadamer “interpretation” always has a normative aspect. See infra note 264 and accompanying text; cf. Mootz,
Originalist Fixation, supra note 23, at 167-68 (noting the classical roots of the interpretation/construction distinction,
and the distinction’s failure to solve the problems of Romantic hermeneutics). Of course, this would not work with
Solum’s argument, either.
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separation is the very ground on which he criticizes Emilio Betti’s Romantic hermeneutics. 263As
we’ve seen, 264 for Gadamer, interpretation and application combine in a single event of
understanding.

This is clear from (i) Gadamer’s arguments that understanding is always

interpretation is always application; 265 (ii) his invocation of Aristotelian ethics, which rejects all
abstract rule-bound answers to moral questions; 266 and (iii) his designation of legal interpretation
as the general model of hermeneutics in the human sciences, in which the application of a text is a
necessary constituent of its meaning. 267 As each of these discussions shows, interpretive meaning
is rendered in application, not before it, because application is necessarily application to the
interpreter and her situation, and not merely to a case or circumstance unrelated to her. 268

GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 320-21; id., supp. I at 532-39. See also Mootz, Originalist
Fixation, supra note 23, at 168 (The “severe epistemic challenges” posed by the interpretation/construction distinction
suggest “the ontological impossibility of conceptually separating the ‘meaning’ of a text and its significance for the
reader who seeks the meaning.”).
Betti argued that the separate determination of “cognitive” or descriptive meaning and normative meaning
are different steps in the interpretive process. 2 BETTI, TEORIA GENERALE, supra note 53, § 54 at 802-04. He also
argued that the cognitive meaning communicated by a legal text will often be too vague or ambiguous to resolve the
legal conflicts presented by a particular case, in which case the interpreter would need to elaborate the meaning in
order to profitably apply it to specific situations. 2 id., § 54 at 804, 807-08, 822; Betti, Hermeneutics, supra note 53,
at 83. See also 2 BETTI, TEORIA GENERALE, supra note 53, § 55 at 819 (author’s translation):
263

[T]he task of extracting from law (or custom) the decisional holding suited to the factual situation submitted
to judgment normally comprises two successive operations, different from but logically connected to each
other: a) the ascertainment of the existing legislative or customary norms and of the categories of interests
protected by them; and, where this does not sufficiently and unambiguously determine the precept to be
applied, b) the further elaboration of the holding required for the decision of the case.
The basics of Betti’s interpretive theory are set out in English in Betti, Hermeneutics, supra note 53, and he is widely
summarized and discussed in the secondary English literature, often in the context of legal interpretation, see, e.g.,
GRONDIN, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 53, at 125-29; David Couzens Hoy, Interpreting the Law:
Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist Perspectives, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 136, 137-41 (1985); PALMER, supra note 56, at
46-59. See also HIRSCH, supra note 133, at xii (acknowledging the influence of Betti and Teoria Generale).
264

See supra Part II-B.
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See supra text accompanying notes 171-79.

266

See supra text accompanying notes 181-199.

267

See supra text accompanying notes 200-30.

268

See supra text accompanying notes 231-35.
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Third, Solum is wrong to read theoretical significance into Gadamer’s assignment to judges
of the “creative” or normative function of application. 269 Understanding/interpretation/application
always involves normative considerations, because understanding/interpretation/application
includes the unity descriptive/normative. “To distinguish between a normative function and a
cognitive one is to separate what clearly belong together.” 270 Understanding for Gadamer always
incorporates a question with both descriptive and normative dimensions: how to fuse the text’s
horizon—the concerns of the past—with the interpreter’s horizon—the concerns of the present.
Gadamer emphasized the normative function in the passages Solum quoted because Gadamer
wished to disabuse historicists of their norm-free self-image—by showing that the writing of
history is as normative as deciding legal disputes—and not because he was engaged in neworiginalist construction. 271
Without these three premises—substitution of “construction” for “interpretation,”
conceptual separation of interpretation from application, and exclusive assignment of normative
considerations to application, Solum’s conclusion that Gadamerian hermeneutics presupposes the
fixation thesis is mere question-begging: “Interpretation” as defined by public-meaning
originalists entails the fixation thesis, but this tells us nothing about “interpretation” as understood
by Gadamer and philosophical hermeneutics, which includes application by definition.

269

See supra text accompanying note 213.

270

E.g., GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 321. See also supra note 262.

Solum acknowledged this at the outset of his analysis, but did not discuss it further. See Solum, Hermeneutics and
the Fixation Thesis, supra note 22, at 145 (noting “Gadamer’s critique of the view that the task of legal historians and
jurists is fundamentally different”).
271
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IV. ACCOUNTS OF HERMENEUTIC ONTOLOGY
Professors Whittington and Solum each give illustrations purporting to show the
superiority of the fixation thesis to the hermeneutic ontology which denies that textual meaning
objectively exists in the past. Whittington uses art restoration, while Solum appeals to various
historical events, though his reference to the Holocaust will suffice to illustrate his point.
A. Whittington and Art Restoration
At the end of Whittington’s argument against the unity understanding/interpretation/
application, he sums up with this example:
[A]n originalist seeking to salvage a soiled painting would gradually clear away smudges
in order to see better the original portrait beneath. As layers of dirt are removed and the
canvas and paints tested, details emerge to deepen our perception of the figure who was
always vaguely visible, and occasionally false marks are removed to reveal the original
underneath. A Gadamerian interpreter, on the other hand, would not be seeking to deepen
our understanding of the artist’s portrait by revealing details contained in the original.
Rather, he would seek to expand the artist’s vision for the new audience, adding new details
with fresh paint, multiplying the portraits appearing on the canvas. 272
The originalist art restorationist is epistemologically familiar. She works on the assumption
that the original exists under the many layers of varnish and grime. Using proper restorationist
methods designed to recover the original without altering it, she removes the accumulations from
the painting so that it comes into view just as the artist painted it. Fidelity to the original preserved,
the painting is restored for all to see and understand.
The second art restorationist is evidently Gadamer, but he’s not recognizable even as
caricature. The hermeneutic restorationist would not expand on the original by using “fresh paint”
to create a different portrait. To the contrary, she would be just as concerned to uncover the original
painting as the originalist. But having done so, she would ask, “What does the painting mean?”
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WHITTINGTON, INTERPRETATION, supra note 1, at 105.
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No painting has self-declaring meaning, not even at its unveiling. 273 And no recognized classic
obtains that status from its initial reception (“instant classics” notwithstanding). 274 The Mona Lisa
is the portrait of a medieval merchant’s wife, but this original understanding hardly matters today.
The hermeneutic restorationist would also be interested in how and why the “varnish and
grime” ended up on the painting. Were they simply unavoidable, like soot from medieval oil and
lamps? Did the artist add extra varnish at the very end to tone down some colors that looked too
bright? Or did the artist paint the original with more boldness than she preferred to ensure a certain
color and contrast after the inevitable accumulation of dust and dirt? 275 Above all, the hermeneutic
restorationist, knowing that meaning is necessarily the product of past and present, would never
imagine that she might achieve an understanding of the painting identical to the understanding it
enjoyed among those present at its unveiling.
The question of artistic meaning is not answered by exposing the work as it was originally
seen. No matter how much we know about that era and the people in it, we cannot see the painting
as they saw it then, but only as we see it now. We cannot appropriate the horizon of the painting
as an object with which we are uninvolved; we might pretend this, but this is self-deception. We
fuse the painting’s horizon with our own by projecting ourselves into its past, but still, it remains
ourselves whom we project.

273
Cf. Mootz, Originalist Fixation, supra note 23, at 160 (“[M]eaning is not a feature of a world that exists separate
from the interpreter.”).
274

See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.

These and related issues were raised by the controversial cleaning of the frescoes in the Sistine Chapel, which
illustrates the ontological problematics of the “original” even in art. See generally Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art
in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, in ILLUMINATIONS 219 (Hannah Arendt ed. & Harry Zohn trans. 1968) (1935).
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Gadamer himself uses art to illustrate this point: “The way the interpreter belongs to his
text is like the way the point from which we are to view a picture belongs to its perspective.”276
No matter how clear the original portrait, what one sees will depend upon where one stands to see
it—up close, far away, left, right, or center. Likewise, historical perspective varies with time,
place, and person.
Consider a mythic event from Roman history, the rape of Lucretia. As recounted by
Livy, 277 around 500 B.C.E. during the siege of a nearby city, Sextus, a son of the Roman king,
assaulted Lucretia, wife of another prince, Collatinus, while a guest in her home. Lucretia swore
Collatinus and his friend, Brutus, to avenge her “lost honour.” 278 They sought to comfort her, as
“sick at heart” as she was, “by diverting the blame from her who was forced to the doer of the
wrong.” 279 But Lucretia would not be comforted. “Taking a knife . . . concealed beneath her dress,
she plunged it into her heart.” 280 In the aftermath Collatinus and Brutus raised an army in rebellion
against the king as revenge for his son’s crime. The people flocked to their banner, for “[e]very
man had his own complaint to make of the prince’s crime and his violence.” 281 They deposed the
king and drove Sextus into exile, where he was murdered by old enemies. Freed from tyranny, the
people choose Brutus and Collatinus prefects of a new Roman republic.
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Gadamer, Truth & Method, supra note 19, at 338.

1 TITUS LIVIUS, HISTORY OF ROME i.197-209 (B.O. Foster trans. 1919) (c.28 B.C.E.),
https://www.loebclassics.com/view/livyhistory_rome_1/1919/pb_LCL114.197.xml?mainRsKey=ERKSBp&result=1&rskey=2sko2W.
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1 id. at i.203.
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1 id.
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1 id.
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1 id. at i.205.
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Scores of Renaissance, Baroque, and Romantic artists painted this story, a common
depiction being Sextus threatening Lucretia in her bed with his drawn sword. A public-meaning
originalist would seek to document how any such painting was understood at the time it was
unveiled to the public; this would fix its meaning, irrespective of anything that followed. Yet, it
takes little imagination to realize that a contemporary classical historian will understand the
painting differently than a 19th-century Romantic. Both will differ from the understanding of rape
survivor in the Victorian era, whose understanding will, in turn, differ from that of a survivor in
the contemporary West. And all of these potential meanings differ dramatically from Livy’s
intention to justify the violent revolution in which the Roman republic was born. 282
How plausible is it to insist that the meaning of an original Lucretian painting is fixed by
the public understanding of it at the time it was finished and unveiled? Gadamer’s observation
seems indisputable: “[U]nderstanding art always includes historical mediation.” 283 Vastly different
understandings of a Lucretian painting do not come about because someone added “fresh paint”
to the original. They are the consequence of the joint constitution of artistic meaning by past and
present.
B. Solum and Historical Events
Unlike Professor Whittington, Professor Solum recognizes that philosophical hermeneutics
might make ontological claims. He seizes on a statement by Professor Mootz, who has also

See generally MELISSA M. MATTHES, THE RAPE OF LUCRETIA AND THE FOUNDING OF REPUBLICS: READINGS IN
LIVY, MACHIAVELLI, AND ROUSSEAU ch.2 (2000).
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283

GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 165. See also id. at 166:
Reconstructing the conditions in which a work passed down from the past was originally constituted is
undoubtedly an important aid to understanding it. But we may ask whether what we obtain is really the
meaning of the work of art that we are looking for, and whether it is correct to see understanding as a second
creation, the reproduction of the original production.

64

criticized Solum’s position: ‘“There are no objective facts about the past existing independently
of our inquiries; rather, history is our mode of being; as finite beings who can never rise out of our
historical situation.’” 284 Solum accuses Mootz of claiming “there are no objective facts at all,”
which Solum swiftly dispatches as a reductio:
[T]his means there is no fact of the matter about such mundane and insignificant questions
as whether this paragraph was first composed on July 17, 2015. Nor could there be an
objective fact of the matter about the occurrence of the Holocaust or indeed whether the
Allied forces invaded Normandy beginning on June 6, 1944. 285
I take Mootz’s point, though I would have put it this way: “The meaning of the past is not
an objective fact existing independently of our inquiries.” Solum acknowledges Mootz might have
meant merely to distinguish facts about events from facts about meaning, but insists that the
implications are still “radical and implausible.” 286 As a matter of objective fact, he argues, there
can be no doubt that the Constitution’s assignment of “two” senators to each state “meant two and
not three or lasagna.” 287 If there were no objective facts about the meaning of numbers, Solum
reasons, then there would not be any objective linguistic facts at all, either. This, Solum concludes,
is clearly wrong:
Linguistic facts are facts about patterns of human behavior in the world; they are not facts
about some mystical realm that cannot be the subject of empirical investigation. Indeed, a
whole subfield of linguistics, called semantics, is devoted to empirical investigation of
linguistic facts about semantic meaning. 288
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Solum, Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 22, at 149 (quoting Mootz, supra note 23, at 165).
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Solum, Hermeneutics and the Fixation Thesis, supra note 22, at 149.
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Id. at 150.
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Id.
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Id.
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Again, Solum chose an easy target. As Mootz points out, numbers are a special case, able
to retain unambiguous meaning even over long periods of time. 289 No reasonable person disputes,
for example, the date of Kristallnacht or the liberation of Auschwitz. But what does it mean that
the throughout Europe Nazis and their allies persecuted, tortured, and ultimately attempted kill
every Jew in Europe, succeeding to the extent of murdering six million (along with millions of
non-Jews)? Does it mean humans are naturally depraved, or only Germans, or only Nazis? Was
Christianity responsible, with its theology of the blood libel and the passive refusal of most
churches to intervene? Does it represent an unanswerable theodicy that drives people to unbelief?
Did it create contemporary Israel, or would that have happened anyway? Is it related to the current
resurgence of anti-Semitism in the West?
These questions barely scratch the surface of potential plausible meanings. The Holocaust
is a fact in the world, as are the acts and utterances that constitute it. But events do not naturally
possess objective meaning, or any meaning at all; their meaning does not exist until we try to
ascertain it. 290 Similarly, that the Constitution was ratified in 1788 in the precise linguistic form
we possess today does not tell us its meaning, either of the whole or of its many individual clauses.
This is the dilemma of the human sciences, in which meaning is a circle of self-interpretation.
About this most difficult ontological problem, Solum says nothing.

Mootz, supra note 23, at 180. See also GADAMER, TRUTH & METHOD, supra note 19, at 433 (“Only through
mathematical symbolism would it be possible to rise entirely above the contingency of the historical languages and
the vagueness of their concepts.”).
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The enormity of the Holocaust seems to place it beyond any meaning, even when one looks for it.
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C. Domestic Violence
Professor Solum and other public-meaning originalists regularly employ the Domestic
Violence Clause to illustrate the pitfalls of “linguistic drift,” as I’ve discussed. 291 The
contemporary usage signifying physical or sexual abuse of spouse or children was unknown in the
late 1780s when the clause was ratified along with the rest of the Constitution; what we now
understand as “abuse” was considered the unremarkable right of male heads of household during
this period. Solum draws what he thinks is the easy and obvious conclusion: the Domestic Violence
Clause has nothing to do with spousal or child abuse, because the semantic meaning of the clause
was fixed by the semantics existing at the time of its constitutional adoption in the late 1780s.
This conclusion is easily complicated. The historical context of the Domestic Violence
Clause strongly indicates that it was understood to apply to slave revolts. The southern states, with
their huge enslaved populations, feared slave insurrections and sought constitutional guarantees of
federal assistance when these rebellions exceeded state militia and law enforcement resources. 292
The legal concept of a household in the late 18th century (and for most of the 19th century)
encompassed not just husband, wife, and children, but also servants, apprentices, long term
291

See supra text accompanying notes 38-40.

E.g., Debate in the Virginia Ratifying Convention (14 June 1788), in 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL
CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787 at 365, 427 (Jonathan Elliot 2nd ed. 1891) (remarks of George Nicholas) (The
Domestic Violence Clause provides “greater security” to slave states by authorizing use of federal power to “quell an
insurrection of slaves” upon state application.); St. George Tucker, View of the Constitution of the United States, in 1
BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES App. Note D at 140, 367 (St. George Tucker ed. 1803) (The Domestic Violence
Clause “secures . . . additional force to the aid of any of the state governments, in case of an internal rebellion or
insurrection against it’s [sic] authority,” and the “southern states” are “more peculiarly open to danger from this
quarter.”). See also Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress Antislavery Speech, Press, and
Petition in 1835-37, 89 NW. U.L. REV. 785, 791 (1995) (suggesting that the Domestic Violence Clause was a proslavery provision “applicable to slave revolts”); Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The
Creation of the Proslavery Constitution, 32 AKRON L. REV. 423, 429 & n.23 (1999) (noting that abolitionist Wendell
Phillips considered the Domestic Violence Clause one of “five key proslavery provisions of the Constitution”).
The first slave rebellion took place in Virginia little more than a decade after the Constitution was ratified,
WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY, supra note 50, at 534-36, and slave insurrections remained a fact of southern life until
slavery was formally abolished after the Civil War, see U.S. CONST., amend XIII (1866).
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visitors, and anyone else living on the householder’s premises or property at his sufferance,
including slaves. While there is, quite literally, no evidence the framers intended the clause to
apply to anything other than insurrections (including slave revolts) against the state governments
and the established private order they upheld, is irrelevant to new-originalist method, which
focuses on the original semantic meaning of the Constitution, not the framers’ subjective
understanding. A slave revolt in the late 18th century, directed at the householder and control of
his household, was “domestic violence” in the same plausible semantic sense that spousal and
child abuse is today. Contrary to Solum’s assumption, application of the Domestic Violence Clause
to contemporary spousal and child abuse would actually entail very little linguistic drift.
I will not be arguing that the original public meaning of the Domestic Violence Clause
authorizes the federal government to deploy troops and resources upon state request to eliminate
child and spousal abuse within state borders. I raise this to emphasize the crucial role played by
historical context. Our current belief that the phrase “domestic violence” in Article IV cannot
plausibly refer to spousal or child abuse overwhelms the original semantic meaning, making it
impossible to take it seriously despite the presence of a plausible semantic argument. In many
cases, therefore, if not most, the purported discovery of original public meaning will depend on
objective recovery the factual historical context that stabilizes and specifies original semantic
meaning. This not a simple matter.
For example, it is virtually impossible for any reasonable contemporary American to
imagine him- or herself in a society in which men, women, and children are bought, sold, and
abused as mere property, and male heads of household have substantial control of bodies, labor,
liberty, and property of their spouses, children, and servants, including the right to inflict corporal
punishment whose legality and propriety is judged by him alone. To recover the original public

68

meaning of the Domestic Violence Clause requires that we understand its original semantic
meaning as specified by its original context. Everything depends on what I’ve elsewhere called
the “immaculate recovery” of context: we must recover “facts about context” without tainting their
factual character with our subjective particularities, and then we must understand those facts as
they were understood by those acting in their original context. 293 In this hypothetical, this means
transforming ourselves into southern lords of the manor who believed in their bones that both God
and law justified their use of African Americans human beings as chattel, and their commission of
(what is now but was not then) illegal abuse of women and children. No reasonable person in the
present can do this.
D. It’s a Wonderful New Originalism!
The ontological implausibility of the fixation thesis is exposed in analysis of any
traditionary text, but especially one acclaimed as a classic like the film, It’s a Wonderful Life. 294
The film’s classical status ensures that most people have seen it or know the plot, yet it presupposes
a dramatically different America than the one we live in now. It also contains an especially
accessible understanding of the difference between a Cartesian world divided between into human
subjects and worldly objects, and human being-in-the-world in which people are always already
in relationships with other people and things in the world.
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See Gedicks, supra note 26.

It’s a Wonderful Life (RKO Liberty 1946). See also supra text accompanying notes 97-101.
Despite its old-fashioned sentimentality—or perhaps because of it—the film is on every critic’s “bestmovies” list and remains immensely popular. E.g., Peter Bradshaw, It’s a Wonderful Life, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 14,
2007, available at https://www.theguardian.com/film/2007/dec/14/family.drama; Michael Wilmington, 5 Films That
Are Modern or Would-Be Christmas Classics, CHI. TRIB, Dec. 21, 2001, available at
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2001-12-21-0112210380-story.html. The film scores absurdly high
marks on review aggregation websites. See, e.g., “It’s a Wonderful Life,” ROTTEN TOMATOES (accessed Oct. 17, 2018)
(showing 92% positive reviews from “top” professional film critics, 94% positive from all critics, and 95% positive
from audiences), https://www.rottentomatoes.com/m/1010792_its_a_wonderful_life?.
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It’s a Wonderful Life is a 1946 comedy/drama produced and directed by Frank Capra,
starring James Stewart, Donna Reed, Lionel Barrymore, and Henry Travers. It tells the life story
of the bright and talented George Bailey (Stewart), who is thwarted at every turn in his burning
ambition to leave the provincial “Bedford Falls” of his youth for fame and fortune elsewhere. He
settles down with a local girl, Mary Hatch (Reed), and starts a family. Instead of college, he is
trapped into running his father’s financially beleaguered “Bailey Building and Loan,” which grants
home mortgages to working class folks who cannot qualify anywhere else. In the course of the
story the Building and Loan is left as the only humane institution standing in Bedford Falls after
the wealthy and pitiless Henry Potter (Barrymore) absorbs everything else.
All this is played mostly for laughs until the plot reaches its dramatic climax. George’s
serially incompetent Uncle Billy, kept on at the Building and Loan as a charity case, loses $8,000
of its funds (over $108,000 in current dollars). Unable to replace the missing money and facing
bankruptcy and ruin, George brings himself to the edge of suicide, despairing at the
meaninglessness of his pitiful life and wishing he had never been born.
The conceit of the film is a bevy of guardian angels keeping close watch over George and
his troubles. They send Clarence, a kindly though befuddled junior angel (Travers), to “earn his
wings” by saving George from the mortal sin he is about to commit. Clarence does so by halfgranting George’s wish, giving him a tour of Bedford Falls as if George had never been born.
(George is physically present during this tour, but interacts with family, friends, and neighbors as
a stranger.) Bedford Falls in these visions—called “Pottersville” because in George’s absence
Potter has taken over everything in town—is bereft of all the good George would have done and
all the people he would have saved had he lived. So horribly grim is the world without him in it
that George begs to return to his real life in Bedford Falls. The film ends happily, with all the

70

people George touched pitching in to make good the Building and Loan’s shortfall, and Clarence
earning his wings. Surrounded by family and friends, George realizes that despite all, his is a
wonderful life.
George cannot make sense of Pottersville. Scores of friends and family are in prison, or
insane, or trapped in grinding poverty because George was not there to help them overcome their
situations. His children don’t exist because he was not there to father them with Mary, who instead
never married (and to whom George is a total stranger). By removing George from the scene,
Clarence has not provided an “objective” rendering of life in Bedford Falls, but the entirely
different world of Pottersville—the one that George cannot comprehend. 295
The denouement of It’s a Wonderful Life captures the intuitive implausibility of the fixation
thesis. If George can only find the meaning of his life in the world in which he actually lives, then
he must examine his own life—he must interpret himself. There is no fixed objective George-life
meaning which he can recover as a fact, resting in the past unaffected by who George is and where
and when he lives. Whatever meaning he recovers is historical and temporal, his present
understanding of his past as that past has affected his life down to the moment when he stands on
the edge of suicide.
Though the meaning of his life is not objective, George is not free to make anything he
wishes of it. George finds himself in a world with particular possibilities rather than others. 296 His
possibilities are constrained by the entangling relationships and physical and cultural priors of
Bedford Falls with which he is already involved at every moment. 297 He enjoyed a middle-class
Cf. SOLOMON, supra note 61, at 162 (“The idea of a world known by us which is distinct from the one in which
we act (as in Kant’s ‘two-world’ view) is unintelligible.”).
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upbringing (not an impoverished one); he is a white male (not the African American woman who
is his family’s maid); he lives in a small town (not an urban center); a childhood loss of hearing in
one ear disqualified him from military service (so he could never have become the war hero his
younger brother was); he and Mary have children and build a life together (which eventually make
leaving Bedford Falls impossible); and so on. In short, the meaning of George’s life is
indeterminate within ever-changing bounds, and none of these possibilities is the only or inevitably
true one.
Even so, there remain plenty of interpretive possibilities within the constraints of George’s
situation. He does not “discover” the meaning of his life as a fact, as if it were there all along
before he tried to find it. Rather, this meaning is constantly made for him and by him in the choices
he makes from among the possibilities that remain in the moment he chooses. Every day George
must confront both what his past has made of him and what he still might realistically become.
This interpretive circularity constrains others, too. There is no Mary without George; the
meaning of her life is bound up with the meaning of his. Any examination of George’s life by
Mary would thus also be an examination of her own. Nor can someone wholly unconnected with
George and Mary and their intertwined lives interpret them objectively—say, a film critic in the
present. In the more than 70 years since It’s a Wonderful Life was released, it has become
embedded in a tradition which necessarily shapes how even an apparently disconnected person in
the present can approach its meaning. It is universally acclaimed, a classic, Capra’s (and Stewart’s)
favorite film and possibly Capra’s best; it captures all the crises and courage of the “greatest
generation” which survived the flu epidemic after World War I, suffered the hardship of the
Depression, and then endured even more in the war against fascism; it is a powerfully nostalgic
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representation of a simpler, more faithful America which defines success by belief and family, not
fame or fortune.
All of this predetermines how one can engage the film. Most critics praise it; it’s hard to
criticize it without coming off badly. Either way, one must reckon with what the film has become,
what it is now, not what it was in 1946 when it was released. We in the present are not pure subjects
who can see the film and George’s life as pure objects, because we are at every moment already
within the tradition which surrounds the film and shapes our present understanding of it. Only the
angels can watch the movie “as it really is.”
To understand the past is to understand ourselves, embedded in prior relationships and
traditions that link past and present before we engage in any act of interpretation. We can only
understand the past, therefore, from a point of view that is constituted both by the people we are
and the past we have inherited. There is neither past without the present, nor present without the
past. Present preconceptions and prejudices are not obstacles to understanding the past but the very
ground of this understanding.
This is evident in the portrayal of Mary in It’s a Wonderful Life. The film reflects (what we
today call) the sexist assumptions of seven decades past. Mary’s success in life rests on her
marriage to some successful man; her mother is dismayed when Mary rejects a wealthy, politically
connected suitor to drop out of college and marry the broke and impractical George. But marriage
fulfills all of Mary’s dreams—mother, homemaker, helpmeet; at one point she declares only halfjokingly that she married George to “keep from becoming an old maid” (which is precisely what
she is in Pottersville: a fearful spinster librarian who faints in horror at the insistence of George, a
complete stranger, that together they had sex and produced children.) Mary is the nurturing,
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virtuous, domestic mother devoted to home, husband, and children, naturally unsuited for life in
the real world of aggression, competition, and conflict—the world of men.
The 1946 reviews did not note these sexist stereotypes, 298 not even reviews in the urban
liberal press, 299 because in 1946 they were neither sexist nor stereotypes. Mary’s character
captured the tenor of the times, the conventional picture of how women are and what they want,
assumed even by cultural elites. The gender stereotypes are evident in the present because we live
in a radically different world in which gender roles are not passively accepted as destinies of
Nature. It is precisely the contemporary commitment to gender equality that brings into focus
Mary’s portrayal as stereotypically sexist. Without this preconception, Mary’s character would
pass as an unremarkable reflection of natural female aspiration, as it did in 1946. A feminist
critique of the film cannot exist until feminism becomes a noticeable part of the American cultural
landscape a generation later.
A double irony is that the gender equality that creates the sexism in the film also produces
several moments in which Mary acts against type. It is Mary, not George, who offers their
honeymoon savings to rescue the Building and Loan during a Depression bank run. It is Mary, not
George, who buys the dilapidated mansion they fix up as their home. And it is Mary—and certainly
not George, who by now is off wallowing in self-pity—who raises the missing $8,000 to rescue
George and the Building and Loan from ruin. Mary seems to be the only person in the film besides

E.g., Bert Briller, Review: It’s a Wonderful Life, VARIETY, Dec. 16, 1946, available at
http://variety.com/1946/film/reviews/it-s-a-wonderful-life-1200414860/; Kate Cameron, James Stewart Back in ‘A
Wonderful Life’, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Dec. 21, 1946, at 22 col.1; It’s a Wonderful Life, HOLLYWOOD RPTR., Dec. 19,
1946, available at http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/a-wonderful-life-1946-movie-754681.
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E.g., James Agee, Films, 163 THE NATION, Dec. 28, 1946, at 766; Bosley Crowther, The Screen in Review: At
Three Theatres, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1946, available at https://www.nytimes.com/1946/12/23/archives/the-screenin-review-at-three-threatres-its-a-wonderful-life-with.html; Current Cinema: Angel of Whimsey, THE NEW YORKER,
Dec. 21, 1946, at 87.
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Potter with any financial know-how. 300 Our present preconception of gender equality, virtually
nonexistent in 1946, creates a feminist understanding of some of Mary’s actions in a film filled
with sexist anachronisms.
By “objectively” removing our contemporary commitment to gender equality and every
other contemporary prejudice, were it even possible, we would remove one of the ways we
understand It’s a Wonderful Life, extinguishing both its gender stereotyping and its recognizably
proto-feminist moments. It would also leave us safe in our present, unable to take seriously Mary’s
life as a model even though women still choose it. To call Mary’s character stereotypical and
repressed is already to reject her life as a model for one’s own.
E. Public-Meaning Originalism and Brown
Conforming to the contemporary imperative that one’s interpretive theory account for
Brown v. Board of Education, Professor Solum has offered an abbreviated originalist defense of
Brown, 301 based on a revisionist interpretation of the 14th Amendment by Professor McConnell.302
McConnell argues that a series of congressional debates and votes on the Civil Rights Act of 1875
two to six years after ratification of the amendment demonstrates that Brown was either “correctly
decided on originalist grounds” or “within the legitimate range of interpretations commonly held”

See Robert Beuka, Imagining the Postwar Small Town: Gender and the Politics of Landscape in It’s a Wonderful
Life, 51 J. FILM & VIDEO 41, 43 (1999-2000).
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Lawrence Solum, Hearings on the Nomination of the Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch to Be an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 31 DPCE ONLINE 575, 577 & n.5 (2017),
http://www.dpceonline.it/index.php/dpceonline/article/view/428/417. (DCPE Online is published by Diritto Pubblico
Comparato e Europeo.) This statement is a slightly expanded and footnoted version of Statement of Lawrence Solum,
Hearings on the Nomination of the Honorable Neil M. Gorsuch to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (March 23, 2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/download/03-2317-solum-testimony. All citations hereafter are to the later, expanded DPCE Online version.
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Michael McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 457 (1995)
[hereinafter McConnell, Originalist Case]. This essay is a much abridged version of Michael W. McConnell,
Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947 (1995) [hereinafter McConnell, Originalism &
Desegregation].
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in 1868. 303 Legal historians praised McConnell’s work for the new light it shed on public school
segregation during Reconstruction, but forcefully rejected his claim that the original meaning of
the 14th Amendment precluded racially segregated public schools. 304 Nevertheless, McConnell’s
account remains the leading originalist justification of Brown.
Professor Solum endorses McConnell’s account despite its departure from both halves of
the new-originalist method to which he is committed. First, McConnell does not attempt to
ascertain the original semantic meaning of the 14th Amendment in 1868—that is, whether a literate
person of the time would have understood the amendment’s guarantee of the “privileges or
immunities of citizenship” or the “equal protection of the laws” to have prohibited state-mandated
racial segregation of public schools. 305 Nor does McConnell produce contextual evidence from the
drafting or ratification of the Amendment between1866 to 1868 which might have specified the
Amendment’s ambiguous semantic meaning to prohibit segregated public schools. 306
303

McConnell, Originalist Case, supra note 302, at 458.
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McConnell, Reply to Klarman, supra note 304, at 1946.
McConnell argues that congressional debates about school desegregation in the early 1870s were rich and
robust, making them far better evidence of the meaning of the 14th Amendment than what he calls the “weak and
scattered” evidence available during the actual ratification debates in 1868. McConnell, Reply to Klarman, supra note
304, at 1944; McConnell, Originalist Case, supra note 302, at 459. This is a nonsequitur; congressional debates after
ratification of the 14th Amendment are not evidence of the public meaning of the 14th Amendment at the time of
ratification, unless there is reason to believe that post-ratification understandings coincided with the public meaning
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Professor McConnell’s originalist defense of Brown and Professor Solum’s wholesale
adoption of it are examples of what Gadamer calls (in the awkward English translation) “workingeffective history” or, roughly, the effects that history imposes on meaning through time. 307 We do
not stand outside of the history we investigate; what we choose to examine and how we understand
it are influenced by the current effect on us of the very history we study. I do not doubt that
McConnell undertook his originalist defense of Brown, as he recounts, after reading an 1873
Supreme Court decision which seemed to undermine the conventional wisdom that the 14th
Amendment did not prohibit segregated schools. 308 But a Supreme Court with new-originalist
integrity would reverse many of its prior, nonoriginalist decisions; why pick Brown off the pile to
save?
Influence is notoriously difficult to prove. Still, it seems likely that McConnell’s decision
to develop his defense of Brown, however flawed an example of public-meaning originalism, and
Solum’s decision to endorse it despite these flaws, 309 were related to their respective
methodological commitments to public-meaning originalism in the shadow of Brown’s

at the time of ratification. McConnell gives no such reasons, and his critics provide reasons to believe that public
understandings of the 14th Amendment in the early 1870s diverged sharply from public understandings upon
ratification in 1868. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 304, at 1884, 1900 (arguing that Republican understandings of the
14th Amendment radicalized as they steadily lost political power in the aftermath of ratification). McConnell implicitly
acknowledges the force of Professor Klarman’s argument when he suggests the belated legislative history of the Civil
Rights Act of 1875 is the best evidence available of the original meaning of the 14th Amendment ratified several years
earlier. See McConnell, Reply to Klarman, supra note 308, at 1944.
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canonization. McConnell is a prominent originalist, although he tends to deploy it in practice more
than preach it in theory. 310 Professor Solum is also a prominent originalist, and a foremost theorist
of public-meaning originalism from the 1990s to the present. 311
The moral prestige of Brown requires that any viable interpretive theory justify its result.
But McConnell embarked on his defense of Brown, and Solum endorsed it, long after Brown was
widely acclaimed as a moral highpoint in Supreme Court history, and also after the rise of
originalism and its critics in the 1980s. And the canonization of Brown occurred years after the
decision issued in 1954, and nearly a century after the ratification of the 14th Amendment, which
should make Brown’s very belated prestige methodologically beside the point for public-meaning
originalists. Brown’s canonized after-life generates a present concern: how to defend publicmeaning originalism in the face of (i) Brown’s moral imperative of racial equality, and (ii)
evidence that the 14th Amendment was not understood to have enacted any such principle when it
was ratified in 1868?
In short, the past of the 14th Amendment—its original public meaning—is necessarily
bound up with a present imperative—that any viable theory of constitutional interpretation account
for the result in Brown. Even so committed an originalist as Solum is compelled to transgress
public-meaning methodology to satisfy this imperative.
CONCLUSION: WE’RE ALL NONORIGINALISTS NOW
Just as the contemporary commitment to gender equality creates the understanding of
gender-stereotyping in It’s a Wonderful Life, the contemporary commitment to racial equality
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symbolized by Brown demands an original understanding of the 14th Amendment that includes an
historically implausible warrant for desegregating public schools. The semantic expressions that
compose both film and decision have remained literally unchanged through the intervening
decades; there has been no “linguistic drift.” 312 Nevertheless, each now means something different
than it did in the past.
It’s a Wonderful Life and Brown v. Board of Education have passed down to the present
encased in traditions which affect how we now understand them, at the same time that our present
concerns affect how we understand the past that generated these very traditions. The task of
interpretation is to connect this present with this past, to “fuse their horizons.” 313 We cannot
abandon the present for the past as public-meaning originalism presupposes, because the present
is already baked into the past. Nor can we cut loose the present from the past like those ubiquitous
bogeys, the “living constitutionalists,”314 because the present is always already affected by the
past. This problem is neither purely normative (“How should we interpret the constitution?”) nor
purely epistemological (“How can we interpret the constitution?”), but ontological (“What is
interpretation of the Constitution?”). Constitutional meaning circles among past and present; it
necessarily combines, cannot do other than combine, the effect of the past through history and
tradition on our present concerns, and the shaping exerted by those same present concerns on our
understanding of history and tradition.
Why does this matter? The rhetorical power of originalism is its claim that originalists are
applying objective method (“discovering constitutional meaning”), while nonoriginalists are
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tainted by subjectivity (“making it up”). 315 But this dichotomy is false, because the fixation thesis
is false. “Fixed constitutional meaning” and the other purported objectivities in which new
originalists wrap their method are no less touched by interpretive subjectivity in the present than
the interpretive approaches new originalists attack. Like all human inquiries into proper action in
particular situations, constitutional interpretation is necessarily affected by particularities of the
judge, the issue before her, and their relation to constitutional history and contemporary
constitutional, political, and social imperatives. None of this is subject to adjudication by a priori
rule or objective method, as public-meaning originalists imagine.
No one occupies an interpretive high ground, because none exists. Everyone—judges,
lawyers, and professors, those on the right and the left, originalists and not—is doing the same
interpretive thing—trying to connect the exigencies of the present with a document more than two
centuries in force, adopted under radically different circumstances, reflecting sometimes
anachronistic and occasionally repugnant values, with a peculiar ongoing history that perpetually
closes off some interpretive options even as it opens up others. We are all non-originalists now,
though not everyone will admit it.
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